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Abstract 
A flight test program that evaluated the results of a CP140 Aurora cockpit 
modernization project was conducted between May 2004 and October 2005. This paper 
uses the results of that test program to show how basic human factors principles were 
violated which led to the identification of multiple design deficiencies. This paper 
proposes that the failure to apply good human factors principles when designing aircraft 
displays can lead to unacceptable deficiencies. The result can be poor modal awareness, 
confusion in the cockpit, and often negative training for the pilots. In particular, four 
major deficiencies were analyzed to determine the specific human factors principles that 
were breached. The violations included a lack of concise and relevant feedback to the 
pilot, unclear and ambiguous annunciations, poor use of colour coding principles and 
logic, a lack of suitable attention capture cueing, inappropriate alert cueing, an absence of 
aural cueing during specific degraded modes of operation, excessive cognitive workload, 
and a failure to incorporate the pilot as the focal point of the display design, also known 
as a human centred design philosophy. Recommendations for system design 
enhancements are provided to ensure safe and effective operations of this prototype 
system prior to operational implementation.  
The evaluation of the prototype system design was conducted by a flight test team 
from the Aerospace Engineering Test Establishment in Cold Lake, Alberta and supported 
by the Maritime Proving and Evaluation Unit in Greenwood, Nova Scotia. The test 
program encompassed a thorough review of system design documentation, abinitio 
training and preliminary testing in a Systems Integration Lab and 40 flight test missions. 
The recorded deficiencies were based upon the observations of two Qualified Test Pilots.
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Chapter 1 - Introduction 
 The Aerospace Engineering Test Establishment (AETE), a sub-unit of the 
Canadian Forces Flight Test Center, conducted a flight test program to evaluate the 
results of a CP140 Aurora cockpit upgrade between May 2004 and October 2005. AETE, 
a lodger unit of 4 Wing, located in Cold Lake, Alberta, is the primary developmental 
flight test agency in the Canadian Forces (CF). AETE was augmented throughout this 
program by members of the Maritime Proving and Evaluation Unit (MP&EU) located at 
14 Wing in Greenwood, Nova Scotia. MP&EU is the CFs operational flight test unit for 
the CP140 fleet. Numerous deficiencies, many of which were considered unacceptable in 
whole or in part due to human factors considerations, were uncovered by the combined 
test team through the testing and evaluation of the new systems and displays.  
 This paper proposes that the failure to apply good human factors principles when 
designing aircraft displays can lead to unacceptable deficiencies. The violation of sound 
human factors principles can result in poor modal awareness, confusion in the cockpit 
and, in many cases, negative training for the pilots. This can produce less effective and 
less efficient systems, increase the frequency of pilot error and can sometimes 
compromise the flight safety of the aircraft. Specifically during the test and evaluation of 
the CP140 Navigation and Flight Instruments Modernization Project (NFIMP), an 
analysis of four major deficiencies highlighted the following human factors design 
principle violations: a lack of concise and relevant feedback to the pilot; unclear and 
ambiguous annunciations; poor use of colour coding principles and logic; a lack of 
suitable attention capture cueing; inappropriate alert cueing; an absence of aural cueing 
during specific degraded modes of operation; excessive cognitive workload; and a failure 
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to incorporate the pilot as the focal point of the display design, also known as a human 
centred design philosophy. Recommendations for system design enhancements are 
provided to ensure safe and effective operations of this prototype system prior to 
operational implementation. 
Background 
 The Canadian government purchased the CP140 Aurora, a large four engine 
turboprop aircraft designated as a long range patrol aircraft, in the early 1980s to serve as 
the primary CF maritime patrol aircraft. The CP140 is a multi-role platform responsible 
for a wide array of missions that range from anti-submarine warfare to intelligence, 
surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) to search and rescue (SAR) to special operations 
(Department of National Defence [DND], 2001). Several photographs showcasing the 
CP140 aircraft in its operational environment can be seen in figures 1.1, 1.2 and 1.3. 
 The age of the Aurora aircraft led the Department of National Defence (DND) to 
establish the Aurora Incremental Modernization Project (AIMP) as a way to upgrade 
flight and mission essential systems that were becoming obsolete. One element of the 
AIMP was the Navigation and Flight Instruments Modernization Project (NFIMP), which 
consisted of an Avionics Management System (AMS), an Electronic Flight Display 
System (EFDS), an Automatic Flight Control System (AFCS), a Radar Altimeter and 
Altitude Warning System (RAAWS), a Traffic Collision and Avoidance System (TCAS) 
and a new Identification Friend or Foe (IFF) system. The deficiencies that were 
discovered during the testing and evaluation of these systems led to the initiation of this 
paper and serve as its foundation.  
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Figure 1.1. The CP140 returning from a fisheries patrol. 
 
 
Figure 1.2. The CP140 conducting a low-level, over-water ASW mission. 
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Figure 1.3. The CP140 involved in a SAR mission over the Rocky Mountains. 
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Description of the Deficiencies 
The systems under test were evaluated first through a review of the system design 
documentation, followed by a series of familiarization sessions in the contractor's System 
Integration Lab (SIL) and finally through a series of flight tests. The test team highlighted 
many potential deficiencies during the document review and familiarization stages of the 
test program, however it was not until the flight test stage that the systems could be fully 
evaluated by the test pilots in an operational environment. 
Upon completion of the initial NFIMP test program in October 2005, over 1100 
flight related deficiencies had been identified. Four of these deficiencies have been 
selected for discussion in this paper due to their impact on the successful accomplishment 
of the mission, their impact on pilot workload as well as their potential effects on flight 
safety. The four deficiencies are outlined in the following four paragraphs. 
Deficiency One  Autopilot and Flight Director System (AFDS) Loss of Signal 
The first deficiency involved poor pilot feedback from the AFDS/EFDS operator-
machine interface during the loss of a selected navigation source. The resultant loss of 
situational awareness and delayed response time resulted in aircraft excursions from the 
desired track. This also increased pilot workload and created an appropriate backdrop for 
an in-flight incident or accident. 
Deficiency Two  Automatic Flight Control System (AFCS) Disengagement Feedback 
The second deficiency was a failure of the electronic flight displays to provide 
clear and unambiguous feedback to the pilot after any disengagement of the AFCS, or 
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autopilot. There were two types of disengagements: normal and non-normal, and there 
were deficiencies associated with both. A non-normal disengagement was any 
disengagement that occurred and was not initiated by the pilot through the primary 
method of disengagement. This deficiency was observed any time the autopilot became 
disengaged. The lack of a clear, easy to understand signal to the pilot indicating the 
appropriate autopilot disengagement mode resulted in an increase in cognitive processing 
time and a decrease in pilot response time. If left uncorrected, this would create confusion 
in the cockpit and under certain conditions could be catastrophic. One such situation 
occurred on December 29, 1972 when a L1011 Tristar aircraft crashed into the Florida 
everglades after the pilot inadvertently disconnected the autopilot while the crew was 
troubleshooting a malfunctioning landing gear indicator. No one realized that the 
autopilot had become disconnected and the aircraft descended into the everglades, killing 
101 of 176 people onboard (NTSB, 1972). 
Deficiency Three  Unselected Approach Guidance 
The third deficiency was misleading approach guidance that was displayed on the 
EFDS for approaches that were not selected by the pilot. A standard display design would 
require the pilot to physically select the desired navigation source, in addition to having a 
valid and tuned frequency or channel in the navigation control set. In the NFIMP system, 
regardless of what navigational guidance was chosen for display on the EFDS, the ILS or 
localizer approach symbology would automatically appear on the EFDS whenever a valid 
frequency was dialed into the ILS receiver. This was first observed while flying a non-
precision military TACAN instrument approach and precision ILS approach guidance 
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was also being displayed on the EFDS. This was confusing to the pilot and required extra 
time to process what information was relevant and what information was not. This design 
would have the undesired effect of conditioning the aircrew to selectively disregard 
information provided to them on their primary flight displays and for miscommunication 
and confusion in the cockpit during a critical phase of flight.  
Deficiency Four  Coupled versus Uncoupled status of the Autopilot and Flight Director 
System (AFDS) 
 The fourth deficiency was an inconsistent method of displaying the coupled state 
of the autopilot on the EFDS. When the autopilot was engaged, it was either coupled or 
uncoupled. This was an important distinction and it was important for the pilot to easily 
ascertain the correct state of the autopilot. The prototype design used two different 
methods of displaying this information, which led to confusion in the cockpit. This 
deficiency was first observed when the aircraft deviated from the desired flight path 
because the test pilot had mistakenly believed the autopilot to be in a coupled state. A 
failure to address this deficiency would result in a reduction in situational awareness, 
extra cognitive processing time for the pilots, and an increase in workload. Further, this 
deficiency could cause a deviation from the desired flight path, which could be 
catastrophic under certain conditions.  
Significance 
 In the early days of aviation accident investigation, errors and causal factors were 
often attributed directly to the pilot. Historically, well over half of all aircraft accidents 
were attributed to human causal factors. For air carriers, approximately two-thirds of all 
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accidents are attributable to the cockpit crew while in general aviation, human causes are 
responsible for almost nine out of ten accidents (Nagel, 1988, p. 266).  
 A systems approach to accident investigation has become widely accepted within 
the military and civilian flight safety communities. Using a systems approach, we look at 
errors and causal factors that can also be attributed to the systems themselves. Human 
Factors Engineering (HFE) is often applied to designs in an attempt to minimize error by 
making the systems more forgiving or error tolerant.  
 In all of the deficiencies listed above, insufficient, unclear or misleading 
information is provided to the pilot. A failure to provide the pilot with the accurate and 
necessary information in a timely manner can lead to errors in judgment and poor 
decisions that can in turn compromise flight safety and mission effectiveness. While 
human error may remain a primary cause factor in the majority of accident investigations, 
improving system design and the implementation of procedures can assist the pilot and 
reduce the potential for such errors to occur. This paper uses a systems approach to 
address the potential for human error. Through analysis of the four deficiencies listed 
above, this paper makes recommendations for system enhancements to reduce the 
likelihood that these errors will occur. 
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Chapter 2  Literature Review 
 Transforming an antiquated cockpit with analog displays to a modern glass 
cockpit is a challenging task. It is particularly challenging when conducting a partial 
upgrade program where only part of the cockpit is undergoing the modernization. This is 
due to the fact that it is often easier to re-design the complete network of interrelated 
systems using a common philosophy than to try to integrate individual segments on a 
piece-by-piece basis. Notwithstanding the challenges of integrating all of the individual 
sub-components, there are basic human factors principles that must be considered in the 
design of each new piece of equipment such that it contributes in a positive way to the 
overall efficiency, effectiveness and safety of the flight operations. One of the goals of 
modern, high technology glass cockpits is to improve safety and efficiency by reducing 
pilot workload and eliminating the human errors that have contributed to past aviation 
accidents. While advances in automation have been shown to reduce certain areas of 
workload and certain types of errors, automation has also been shown to cause an 
increase in workload in other areas and has spawned new sources of potential error 
(Sarter & Woods, 1995; Woods, 1993; Masalonis et al., 1999). This chapter provides an 
overview of current literature in the areas of human factors, human error, display design 
considerations (such as colour coding, auditory cueing, display clutter and cognition), and 
the topical issue of modal awareness as they relate to the deficiencies outlined in this 
paper. 
Human Factors 
 In an attempt to determine an appropriate and useful definition for human factors, 
Licht & Pozella (1989) discovered that collectively, more than 90 definitions exist to 
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explain the terms human factors, ergonomics and human factors engineering. Despite 
ongoing discussions regarding the sharp distinctions (Licht et al., 1989, p. 5) amongst 
these terms, others such as Elwyn Edwards (1988) argue that for most situations, these 
terms may be considered to be synonymous. Therefore, for the purpose of this paper, the 
terms human factors, ergonomics and human factors engineering will be used 
interchangeably. The following definition, taken from J. Adams (1989) book on Human 
Factors Engineering, provides a broad definition from which we can work: The field of 
human factors engineering uses scientific knowledge about human behavior in specifying 
the design and use of a human-machine system. The aim is to improve system efficiency 
by minimizing human error (p. 3).  
 In 1972, Edwards published a conceptual model that is a useful tool in 
understanding the practical application of human factors principles. Edwards SHEL 
model (Figure 2.1) describes the interactions between software, hardware, and liveware, 
as well as the environment in which they all coexist. Software is identified as the rules, 
regulations, standard operating procedures, customs, practices and habits that guide the 
operation of the system and the way the human operator is expected to interact with it. 
The hardware comprises the physical components of a system, the displays, antennae, 
control panels, and may also include the building, aircraft, or any other physical material. 
Liveware is the term used to describe the human component, that which operates the 
system. The environment is the overall context in which the interactions take place, and 
may include such things as economic, political and social factors. Using this construct, it 
becomes easier to visualize and understand the interactions that represent the primary 
concern of the field of Human Factors Engineering. 
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Figure 2.1. SHEL Model.    
The SHEL model showing the relationships between the liveware (humans), the software 
(rules, regulations, standard operating procedures), hardware (panels, displays, levers) 
and the environment in which they all coexist. Human Factors is interested in optimizing 
the interaction of these components. 
 
 This paper focuses primarily on the interfaces of the interactions between 
components within the physical construct of a cockpit. It is certainly true that 
mismatches at the interfaces, rather than catastrophic failures of single components, 
typify aviation disasters (Edwards, 1988). The interface between the liveware and 
hardware, or L-H interface, is often referred to as the operator-machine interface and is 
one of the primary areas of discussion in this paper. The interface between the liveware 
S
L
E
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and software, or L-S interface, will also be addressed through discussions concerning the 
resolutions of deficiencies identified in the L-H interfaces. 
Flight Safety and Human Error 
 The aviation industry has a high level of interest in human factors, ergonomics 
and human factors engineering due to its impact on three areas: safety, efficiency of the 
system and the well-being of crew members (Civil Aviation Authority, 2002). In terms of 
flight safety, results of an analysis of accident data by Alan Hobbs (2004) suggest that 
human factors have been the primary flight safety issues since the early days of aviation. 
It was a desire to maximize flight safety and to strive for the optimal operational 
efficiency of the NFIMP prototype systems that led to the identification of the 
deficiencies listed in this report. 
 Safety is among the highest priorities of any aviation organization whether it be 
general aviation, commercial aviation or the military (during peacetime operations). 
Flight safety and human error are undeniably linked. Human error has been recognized as 
the primary or secondary cause factor in as many as 87% of accidents (Allnut, 2002; 
Javaux, 2002; Amalberti & Wioland, 1997; Nagel, 1988). However, stating that human 
error is a causal factor in a majority of accidents is only a first step towards improving the 
flight safety of aviation systems.  
 Human error can itself be a nebulous term. Similar to the ambiguities that exist 
for the definition of human factors, there are also an abundance of differing opinions on 
human error, what constitutes an error, how human errors are measured, and so on 
(Wiegmann & Shappell, 2000; Nagel, 1988). Historically, accident investigations have 
labelled human error (or pilot error for our purposes) as a primary cause of an accident 
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without further explanation. What researchers have discovered is that the analysis must 
probe deeper if there are to be realized gains toward flight safety. To this end, there are 
two general approaches to using an analysis of human error to improve safety. One 
school of thought is that to err is human, a thought process that suggests humans will 
make mistakes regardless of whatever preventative efforts are made. This philosophy 
proposes that the best approach is therefore not to attempt to prevent error, but to design 
error tolerant systems (Amalberti & Wioland, 1997). That is to say, systems designed not 
only to recognize the onset of an error, but also to be a fully reversible system to permit 
the operators to correct their errors such that any errors made would not result in 
catastrophic accidents. The second approach argues there is no empirical data to support 
the premise that to err is an inherent human trait (Bogner, 2002, p. 111). This approach 
is based on the belief that human error is preventable and the objective should be to 
design systems and create procedures or methodologies with the goal of reducing or 
eliminating human error. The best solution is probably one that subscribes to both 
philosophies, attempting to minimize errors whenever possible and simultaneously, to 
create more error tolerant systems. 
 In circumstances when the pilot has committed the final unsafe act that resulted in 
the accident or incident, it is easy to focus on the pilot as the primary causal factor in the 
subsequent accident investigation. The literature shows, however, that this is a 
shortsighted perspective and overlooks possible underlying issues or factors that may 
have led to the error. To this end, Reason (1990) proposed a unique and appealing 
approach to looking at human error that has gained widespread acceptance in the aviation 
community. Wiegmann & Shappell (2001) built upon Reasons work to create the 
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Human Factor Analysis and Classification System (HFACS) as a method to analyze 
human error in aviation accident investigations. The HFACS is currently being used 
within both the U.S. and Canadian military Aviation Safety Directorates. Reason argues 
that in addition to the active failures leading to an unsafe act, there are latent failures as 
well. These latent failures can exist but lay dormant for days, weeks, months or years, 
and can range from problems within an organizational culture to inappropriate 
supervision, or in the case of the deficiencies listed in this paper, design flaws. The 
HFACS model proposes that the potential for accidents exists when the latent and active 
failures are aligned. Reason argues that our success in preventing accidents lies in our 
ability to break any link in the chain of events that led to the accident.   
Display Design 
 The topic of display design and the ramifications of a seemingly small design 
flaw are of great importance for this paper. The design of a display is an incredibly 
complex task and the application of HFE in the design is essential. To assist in this 
process there is an abundance of guidance documentation that exists in the form of U.S. 
Department of Defence (DOD) Military Standards (MIL STDs), U.S. DOD military 
handbooks, Federal Aviation Regulations (FARs), Canadian Aviation Regulations 
CARs), FAA Advisory Circulars (ACs), Society of Automotive Engineer (SAE) reports 
and Aerospace Recommended Practices (ARPs). The primary documents used in the 
analysis of the design deficiencies discussed in this paper were MIL-STD-1472F on 
Human Engineering (1999), MIL-STD-411F on Aircrew Station Alerting Systems 
(1997), FAA-AC-25-11 on Transport Category Airplane Electronic Display Systems 
(1987), SAE/ARP 1874 on Design Objectives for CRT displays for Part 25 Aircraft 
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(1988), SAE/ARP 4102 on Flight Deck Panels, Controls and Displays (1988), and 
SAE/ARP 4102/7 on Electronic Displays (1988). These guidance documents provide 
standardization and direction to enhance the safety and usability of systems based upon 
years of experience and lessons learned through research and accident investigations. 
These reference documents provide the designers with vast amounts of information 
ranging from appropriate font sizes to standard colour coding to display layout, and 
include guidance on most aspects of design consideration, including human cognition. 
 Of paramount importance when considering the design of aviation displays is the 
role of the pilot, which Billings championed in his 1991 paper entitled Human Centered 
Aircraft Automation Philosophy. A technology-centered automation approach is the 
opposing design philosophy to the human-centered automation approach that Sarter & 
Woods (1995) argue is at the heart of many human factors issues and modal awareness 
problems. Palmer, Rogers, Press, Latorella and Abott (1995) also support crew-centered 
flight deck design philosophy and back it up with numerous references and significant 
research. A technology-centered approach may contain the most advanced methodologies 
and capabilities but the complexities of such a design philosophy may make the system 
difficult to use and may lend itself to confusion and errors by the operators. A human-
centered approach takes into account the limitations of the operator but also considers the 
operators strengths to achieve an optimum design that supports and assists the operator 
instead of causing confusion. Palmer et al. (1995) best summarize the current philosophy 
on flight deck design in the following way: Supporting the pilot as an individual 
operator is the primary focus of most current human factors guidance  [the] design must 
account for all that is known about how humans perform tasks (p. 13). 
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 Within the context of a human-centered design philosophy, the deficiencies in this 
paper highlight issues involving standard colour coding principles, the use of different 
types of cuing to enhance situational awareness and response time, the inclusion of 
ambiguous information or lack of salient system details, display clutter and the critical 
aspect of human cognition as it relates to display design. 
Colour Coding Principles 
 There are a number of cognitive factors that must be considered if colour is to be 
used in visual displays (Dry, Lee, Vickers & Huf, 2005, p. 13). The use of colour in 
aviation displays can either assist or hinder the pilot depending on how it is applied. The 
use of too many colours or the use of colours to link non-standard associations (e.g. using 
brown instead of blue for the sky) can result in increased processing time and may lead to 
confusion and incorrect responses. When used appropriately, colours can assist to 
distinguish separate but closely grouped items and connect special meaning to words. For 
example, GAMA publication No. 12 (2004) which is one of the FAAs accepted 
recommended practices and guidelines for an integrated cockpit states that coupled 
flight guidance modes should be green, warnings should be red, and cautions or abnormal 
states should be yellow or amber (p. 22). Other publications indicate that colours should 
be linked with abstract concepts such as reds association with danger, yellow with 
caution and green with safety (Dry et al., 2005). These are the same accepted standards 
that are integrated into peoples everyday lives and are engrained in our thought 
processes. Traffic lights are an excellent example of this. 
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 The U.S. Department of Defence military standards specify colour-coding 
schemes for use in visual displays (Helander, 1987) and these same standards are in use 
within the Canadian military. Nikolic, Orr and Sarter (2001) argue that expectations of a 
particular type of signal, such as onsets or colour change, will increase the likelihood of 
that particular cue to capture attention (p. 5A3-1). The strategic use of colour in aviation 
displays can provide a notable contribution to the efficiency and safety of the display 
design.  
 With todays highly complex and information laden systems, it is increasingly 
important to direct, or cue, the pilot to look to the right place at the right time to receive 
the right pieces of information. One way to attract the pilots attention is through the use 
of changing colour, as was discussed above. Visual displays also frequently use the onset 
or flashing of a display element to cue the operator to a significant event. Current 
literature indicates that this latter method of grabbing the pilots attention may not be 
effective. Recent research findings and operational experiences in data-rich event driven 
domains, such as aviation, suggest that this design approach which was supported by 
findings from early basic research on attention capture is not always successful (Nikolic 
et al., 2004, p. 39). According to Nikolic et al. (2004) the early research was basic in 
nature using simple displays and simple tasks that are not representative of the more 
complex and real-world environment of todays aviation displays. The argument is that if 
a person is focused and their attention is locked then a flashing event alone may be 
insufficient to capture the individuals attention. 
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Auditory Cuing 
 One technique that is useful in grabbing the pilots attention is the use of auditory 
systems. One of the advantages of an auditory system is that it is not limited to the pilots 
visual field of view (FOV) but essentially has an unlimited FOV because it can achieve 
attention getting results regardless of where the pilot may be looking (Flanagan, 
McAnally, Martin, Meehan & Oldfield, 1988). One has to be cautious about using 
auditory systems, however, as there can also be pitfalls to these types of systems such as 
using similar sounds for different alert states or long auditory phrases (Wickens & Flach, 
1988). 
 Auditory systems are not suitable as an all encompassing cuing system. Over-use 
of auditory signals can confuse a pilot and create errors. A very successful and common 
use of auditory cues can be found in warning systems. Research has shown that subjects 
can respond more quickly to auditory warning signals than to visual ones (Dry et al., 
2005; Wicken & Flach, 1988). Further studies indicate that auditory cues can be 
particularly useful in visually demanding environments (Sorkin, 1987; Wickens et al., 
1988). It is clear from this literature that just as colour has an important role in modern 
aviation displays, the appropriate implementation of auditory systems can be an 
enhancing feature to increase the likelihood of acknowledging a time critical cue, thus 
enhancing efficiency and safety. 
 The placement of the cue in the display or the location of the cue in the cockpit is 
also an important factor. If an attention getting cue is located in the pilots primary FOV 
it is more likely he will notice it. If the pilot has to look outside his FOV within the 
cockpit to perceive an alert, it is more likely that he will miss it (Flanagan et al, 1988). 
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This is a primary reason for annunciator panels and flashing master caution and master 
warning lights (located in a pilots primary field of view). In their paper on attention 
capture, Nikolic et al. (2004) discuss the significance of cue location. While cues can be 
perceived at a peripheral angle of up to 50 degrees, this visual angle has been shown to 
decrease as the demands of a task increase. Further, the probability of detecting a visual 
cue decreases as the visual angle from the pilots primary field of view increases.  
 The final aspect of attention cuing that relates to this paper is the issue of cue or 
signal similarity. Palmer et al. (1995) argue that to reduce the chance of confusion, alerts 
should be clearly distinct. If the pilot is forced to search for secondary sources of 
information to corroborate the warning cue when the same cue is used for separate and 
unique alerting conditions, the result may be a time lag between the onset of the cue and a 
comprehension of what the cue means. This situation can lead to a loss of situational 
awareness, potentially at a critical moment in time. Palmer et al. (1995) conclude that 
for distinction, different alerts with different intentions should sound and appear 
dissimilar (p. 30). 
Display Clutter 
 Display clutter must also be considered in the design of a display. With the advent 
of electronic displays, it has become possible to overwhelm the pilot with an overload of 
information. If the designer provides the operator with too much information, the 
operator may be incapable of processing it all, especially during periods of high stress 
such as emergency situations. 
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 There is sometimes a fine line between providing the pilot with too much 
information and not providing him with enough information, and the difference to the 
pilot can be significant. The challenge is to provide the right amount of information at the 
right moment to allow the pilot to make the right decision. It is essential that the designer 
achieve the correct balance between excessive display clutter, especially when some of 
the information is extraneous or irrelevant, and providing salient data, the evaluation of 
which is an important function of the flight test personnel. Display clutter is an issue that 
relates directly to fundamental human limitations (Palmer et al., 1995). Numerous 
researchers have studied the implications of display clutter and there is consistent 
agreement as to the problems it can cause (Civil Aviation Authority, 2002; Wickens & 
Carswell, 1995; Stokes et al., 1988). 
 One of the primary issues associated with display clutter is that of close spatial 
proximity. This makes it more difficult to discriminate between individual units of 
information and their source. It can also disrupt the ability of the operator to observe 
movement or change to the display indicators. Another primary issue is that of excess 
information, due to the cognitive limitations of the operator. An excess of information 
inhibits the operators ability to process the information, resulting in a breakdown in 
decision-making ability and increased response time. 
 While display clutter can be a notable problem, an insufficient level of detail or 
the absence of salient cueing can be just as significant. Wickens et al. (1988) discuss the 
absence of cues when discussing issues related to perception. They refer to an analysis of 
an aircraft crash conducted by Fowler (1980) to elaborate the point. In the investigation it 
was noted that the absence of an R on the pilots airport chart was the only way to know 
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that the airport did not have radar. Since this information can be critical to the pilot, 
Fowler argues that it is better to call attention to the absence of this capability by the 
inclusion of a symbol. An R with a line through it may have been a more obvious way 
of presenting this information to the pilot. People simply do not easily notice the 
absence of things (Wickens et al., 1988). 
Cognition 
 All of the preceding information deals with limitations in the human cognitive and 
information processing capability. Cognition relates to the perceiving or knowing of 
information and how we process information (Avis, W.S., 1989). Tied in with cognition 
are some of the fundamental human limitations such as memory, computation, attention, 
decision-making biases and task time-sharing. The issue of cognition in display design is 
not limited to the design of aviation displays. In their paper on submarine display design, 
Dry et al. (2005) discuss how human cognition influences the design of visual displays. 
They define cognition as a broad term that is used to describe processes that are directly 
related to, or involved in, thinking, conceiving and reasoning (p. 9). Without a human-
centered design philosophy, or if the display design fails to account for human cognitive 
limitations, the result can be a system prone to errors, confusion and inherent 
inefficiencies. 
 With the advent of the modern glass cockpit and the increased complexity that 
comes with an increase in automation, it becomes increasingly important to understand 
how humans process information. One of the goals of automation in aviation is to assist 
pilots by reducing their workload. Often the task may become easier with automation but 
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mental workload can sometimes be higher due to the increased system monitoring that is 
required. As a result, not being hands-on often makes it more challenging for pilots to 
maintain situational awareness. Regardless of the purpose of the display, there is 
widespread agreement on the importance of considering cognition in display design and 
the need to account for the limitations in the way that humans process information 
(Wiegmann et al., 2000; Stokes et al., 1988; Woods & Sarter, 1998; Masalonis et al., 
1999; Boy & Ferra, 2004; Allnutt, 2002). 
Modal Awareness 
 The final topic that requires some discussion to complete a thorough literature 
review relevant to this paper is that of modal awareness. Modal awareness issues have 
become more prevalent with the development of advanced cockpits. As systems become 
more automated, pilots spend less time hands on and more time as system monitors. In 
order to make sound decisions, the pilots need to maintain a high level of situational 
awareness, therefore timely and unambiguous feedback from the automated systems is of 
paramount importance. This is not always provided in current systems. According to 
Wiener (1989), the three most commonly asked questions on the highly automated flight 
deck are what is it doing, why is it doing that and what will it do next? 
 One of the potential ramifications of poor situational awareness with an 
automated system is the potential for automation surprises (Sarter, Woods & Billings, 
1997). Automation surprises may be described as situations where crews are surprised 
by actions taken (or not taken) by the autoflight system (Woods et al., 1998, p. 5), and 
arise from an incorrect assessment or miscommunication between the automation and the 
operator. With automation surprises there is a disconnect between the operators 
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expectations of what should happen and what actually occurs. Woods et al. (1998) 
suggest automation surprises occur due to the convergence of three factors: 
1. automated systems act on their own without immediately preceding directions 
from their human partner; 
2. gaps in users mental models of how their machine partners work in different 
situations; and, 
3. weak feedback about the activities and future behaviour of the agent relative 
to the state of the world (p. 6). 
 
Other researchers, such as Endsley & Kiris (1995), view these automation surprises as a 
repercussion of the pilot being out of the loop. They argue that passive processing 
results in a reduced level of situational awareness in automated conditions that diminishes 
the pilots ability to detect errors and to manually intervene if, and when, required. 
 This lack of modal awareness and the onset of automation surprises, if recognized 
too late, can have dire consequences. On December 29, 1972, Eastern Airlines Flight 401 
crashed a Lockheed L1011 into the Florida Everglades near Miami when the flight crew 
became distracted and did not notice that the autopilot had been inadvertently 
disconnected, killing 101 passengers and crew (NTSB, 1972). On January 20, 1992, an 
Air Inter crash near Strasbourg, France demonstrated why operating modes of an 
autopilot need to be unambiguously distinguishable as the Airbus A320 flight crew is 
believed to have mistakenly selected a 3,300 foot per minute vertical descent rate instead 
of a 3.3 degree descent angle. 87 people died in the Air Inter crash (NTSB, 1992). In 
1995 a Boeing B-757 airliner crashed near Cali, Columbia, partially as a result of 
diminished situational awareness in their modern cockpit. 160 people perished in that 
accident (NTSB, 1995). A more comprehensive list of automation-related accidents can 
be found in Wiener and Curry (1980). The accidents highlighted above represent just a 
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few of the many examples that demonstrate how critical modal awareness is in the 
operation of automated cockpits. 
Palmer et al. (1995) suggest ways in which systems may be better designed so as 
to avoid losses in situational awareness and to prevent automation surprises. They talk 
about actively informing the crew of what the automation is doing, both in terms of how 
and why. Emphasis is placed on the feedback of modal status to include human or 
automation initiated mode changes, and they go on to say that the crew must be able to 
determine immediately whether a function is under automatic, semi-automatic or manual 
control, and if a function reverts from automatic to manual control, that reversion must be 
annunciated unambiguously to the crew to ensure they are aware of the reversion (p. 
26). In addition, to reduce the workload associated with the monitoring of automated 
systems, Palmer et al. (1995) suggest the automation should not be designed such that the 
pilot is required to continuously watch it over long periods of time. They go on to say that 
the automation status needs to be readily apparent to both pilots and that both pilots must 
be able to easily distinguish between normal and non-normal situations. These are all 
sound recommendations that bring the flight crew into the center of the design process. 
Conclusion 
 The information provided in this chapter serves as the foundation upon which 
subsequent arguments will be made, and should provide the reader with sufficient 
background to grasp the issues that are raised in the discussion of the four deficiencies. It 
is important for the reader to have a basic understanding of each of the topics presented 
above in order to make the link between aircraft accidents, incidents or system 
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inefficiencies, the human error that triggered them and the underlying causal factors that 
led to the human error in the first place. 
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Chapter 3  Test Item Description 
 This chapter describes the basic operation of the systems discussed within this 
paper. The Navigation and Flight Instrument Modernization Project (NFIMP) system 
upgrade consisted of an Avionics Management System (AMS), an Electronic Flight 
Display System (EFDS), an Autopilot and Flight Director System (AFDS), a Radar 
Altimeter and Altitude Warning System (RAAWS), a Traffic Collision and Avoidance 
System (TCAS) and a new Identification Friend or Foe (IFF) system. The primary focus 
for discussion within this paper is the AFDS system. Since the AFDS system did not 
operate in isolation, but rather interacted and integrated with multiple other systems, a 
brief description of some of these other systems will assist the reader in following the 
arguments laid out in chapter 5.   
Autopilot and Flight Director System (AFDS) 
 The AFDS was a digital replacement of the analog ASW-31 AFCS and flight 
director (FD) system that existed on the legacy CP140 aircraft. The AFDS combined both 
systems and was purchased as a functional replacement only. That is, the new system was 
designed to perform the same functions of the previous two systems with no additional 
enhancements. The main focus of the upgrade was to achieve an increase in reliability as 
the legacy systems were becoming obsolete; the components were breaking down more 
frequently and obtaining parts was becoming increasingly difficult. In addition to 
improved reliability, however, the new system also provided the user with significant 
increases in capability due to the advanced technology that was naturally embedded 
within the more modern unit. For example, the new system had the ability to fly fully 
coupled ILS approaches, an ability the old system lacked. 
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Figure 3.1. CP140 ACP showing the illumination of all possible mode selections. 
 
 Manipulation of the AFDS was through the AFDS control panel (ACP) as shown 
in Figure 3.1. The AFDS could be operated in a number of modes, categorized as either 
inner loop or outer loop modes. The inner loop modes were the basic stability modes of 
the autopilot and included attitude hold, heading hold and the yaw damper. The inner 
loop modes were not capable of affecting a change on the pitch or attitude of the aircraft, 
rather they simply maintained the attitude and heading as set by the pilot. All of the outer 
loop modes required one or more signals generated from outside the AFDS computer, 
such as the navigation mode or the approach mode. The AFDS could be operated as a 
stand-alone autopilot or flight director, or they could be engaged simultaneously. The 
autopilot (AP) portion of the AFDS could also be coupled or uncoupled. The term 
coupled meant that the AP was linked to the outer loop flight guidance. When the AP was 
engaged and coupled, it was directly connected to the aircraft control surfaces and was 
either actively manoeuvring the aircraft or was capable of manoeuvring the aircraft. 
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When the AP was engaged but uncoupled, it was working in its most basic state, capable 
of providing inner loop controls of attitude hold and heading hold only. The five possible 
control combinations for the AFDS are listed in Table 3.1.  
The fourth combination shown in Table 3.1 had the highest potential for 
confusion. In this situation, the autopilot was engaged in the basic stability mode of 
attitude and heading hold and the flight director was providing steering guidance to a 
selected source (for example a TACAN station) in the form of flight director bars. In this 
example, the pilot would be required to manually fly the airplane (following FD 
guidance) as the autopilot would not be coupled to the flight guidance and therefore was 
incapable of manoeuvring the aircraft. In essence, the autopilot and FD were not linked. 
A depiction of the Electronic Flight Director Indicator (EFDI) communicating the AFDS 
status to the pilot is provided in Figure 3.2.  
The AFDS could be disengaged in one of four ways: via the control wheel 
autopilot disconnect switch located on the outboard horn of the pilot or co-pilot control 
yokes; via the AP engage switch on the ACP; via the autopilot emergency disconnect; or 
due to any failure or reversionary mode. The only disengagement that was considered to 
be normal was a disengagement using the switches on the pilot or co-pilot control 
yokes. The other three methods of disengagement were considered non-normal 
disengagements and will be expounded upon in Chapter 5. 
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 Table 3.1. AFDS control combinations. 
This table shows the five control combinations and the functionality associated with each. 
Combination # FD AP Coupled Capability 
1  √  Basic AP stability mode. AP holds an attitude and heading as set by the pilot.  
2  √ √ 
AP is flying the aircraft. It will follow 
whatever guidance is selected using the 
ACP and Display Control Panel (DCP). 
3 √   
FD provides flight guidance to the pilot for 
manual flying only. Guidance is governed 
by ACP and DCP selections.  
4 √ √  
FD provides flight guidance to the pilot for 
manual flying only. The autopilot can assist 
the pilot by maintaining an aircraft attitude 
and heading, as set by the pilot but AP 
cannot steer the airplane on its own. 
5 √ √ √ 
The AP is flying the aircraft. It will follow 
whatever guidance is selected using the 
ACP and DCP. The FD shows the steering 
guidance that the AP is flying which can aid 
in situational awareness. 
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Figure 3.2. CP140 EFDI showing AFDS status combination 5 from Table 3.1.  
In this screen capture the autopilot and FD are both engaged (green AP and FD 
annunciations in the top left hand corner of the display) and the AP is coupled to the 
flight guidance shown (green coupled bar). Two outer loop modes have been selected 
(TACAN navigation and altitude hold) and the FD is providing lateral and vertical 
guidance in the form of magenta flight director bars. 
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Electronic Flight Display System (EFDS) 
 The EFDS consisted of three main interfaces: the EFDI, the electronic horizontal 
situation indicator (EHSI) and the DCP. The EFDI and EHSI were digital replacements 
of the CP140s analog Flight Director Indicator (FDI) and Horizontal Situation Indicator 
(HSI) and the DCP replaced the legacy HSI control panel. While the EFDS was only 
intended to be a functional replacement of the legacy systems, the new glass displays 
provided a significant increase in capability. The software, design philosophy and human 
factors considerations were the only constraints that limited the amount of information 
that was displayed on the electronic displays. The EFDI, EHSI and DCP are shown in 
Figures 3.2, 3.3 and 3.4, respectively. 
 The EFDI was the most relevant display to the deficiencies discussed in this 
paper. The EFDI was the primary display to communicate the AFDS status and provide 
feedback to the pilot or co-pilot regarding mode transitions. This feedback and interaction 
was referred to as the human or operator machine interface and was critical for 
maintaining the situational awareness of the flight crew. The DCP was significant 
because of the way in which it controlled the information presented on the electronic 
flight displays. As well, it was selections on the DCP that determined what signals the 
autopilot would track in the approach and navigation sub-modes (DND, 2003a).  
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Figure 3.3. CP140 EHSI in the VOR navigation mode. 
In this screen capture VOR1 is the selected source for lateral navigation and bearing 
pointers 1 and 2 are selected to VOR2 and VOR 1 respectively. 
 
 
 
Figure 3.4. CP140 DCP. 
This figure shows the arrangement of controls for selecting navigation sources and 
display information. The center knob controls the navigation source for the EHSI and 
also the AFDS. When engaged through the AFDS, guidance to the selected navigation 
source can be displayed on the EFDI. 
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Legacy Navigational Aids 
 Some of the legacy navigational aids on the CP140 included the VOR, ILS and 
TACAN systems. The VOR and TACAN systems were both radio navigation systems 
that could be used for enroute navigation or non-precision instrument approaches. The 
ILS was a precision approach system that guided the pilot to the landing runway. The 
VOR and ILS systems shared the same control head. As a result, the VOR and ILS 
systems were not individually selected but were differentiated by virtue of the frequency 
set into the control head by the pilot. The TACAN was an independent system with its 
own transmitter, receiver and antenna. These legacy systems were fully integrated with 
the new digital NFIMP components allowing the AFDS to fully couple to any of these 
systems through selections on the Display Control Panel and the AFDS Control Panel. 
The two VOR/ILS control heads are shown in Figure 3.5 and the TACAN can be seen in 
Figure 3.6. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.5. CP140 VOR/ILS 1 and VOR/ILS 2 
These two receivers are independent but redundant systems. This control set can function 
as a VOR or as an ILS, depending on the frequency input into the control head. 
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Figure 3.6. CP140 TACAN. 
The TACAN receiver provides navigation guidance to military TACAN sites. It is an 
analog system that can be coupled to the new digital avionics of the NFIMP systems. 
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Chapter 4  Test Methodology  
 The flight test program to evaluate the NFIMP cockpit upgrade on the CP140 
Aurora aircraft was conducted in three phases. Phase one consisted of a comprehensive 
review of the system design documentation. Phase two included an initial familiarization 
session with the NFIMP systems, hands on training, preliminary system evaluations and 
feedback to the contractor. Phase two was carried out using a well-defined, methodical 
approach within two discrete time periods at the contractors SIL. Phase three comprised 
the flight test phase of the test program, and consisted of 40 test flights out of Halifax 
International Airport. This three-phased approach proved to be a successful method of 
uncovering deficiencies that were embedded in the prototype systems. This chapter 
outlines the three phases, discusses the purpose of each phase and highlights the 
constraints, limitations and strengths of each phase. 
 The test philosophy was one in which human factors issues were seen to be very 
important and where relevant comments were collected in each of the phases throughout 
the test program. The test team was comprised of test pilots and flight test engineers who 
were formally trained to be human factors evaluators. The contractor had a human factors 
specialist, as did the Directorate of Technical Airworthiness (DTA) who were responsible 
for the airworthiness components of certification and provided oversight to the program. 
Phase One  Document Review 
 A comprehensive review of the NFIMP system design was a time consuming 
phase of the test program. As part of the document review, test team members examined 
contractual documents to understand the scope of the project and to decipher the 
specifications against which the system performance was being measured. The test team 
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also became intimately familiar with multiple test and certification guidance manuals 
such as the FARs, CARs, MIL-STDs, the Federal Aviation Administration ACs and the 
SAE ARPs as references of the human factors design requirements. The purpose of the 
documentation review was to understand the design philosophy, learn the functionality of 
the systems and to help focus the team on potentially problematic areas for further 
investigation during the subsequent phases of the test program. The review also provided 
an opportunity for the test team to identify potential deficiencies at the beginning of the 
test program and to offer feedback to the contractor up-front with the goal of minimizing 
overall program costs and schedule delays. Document review is an essential part of any 
test program, and was a logical lead-in and prerequisite for phase two of the test program. 
Phase Two  Systems Integration Laboratory 
 Phase two of the test program to evaluate the NFIMP systems on the CP140 
aircraft took place at the contractors SIL. The SIL was created as one of the primary 
developmental tools for the contractor to verify and validate new software for the NFIMP 
program but it also proved to be an invaluable training aid and evaluation device for the 
test teams. Specifically, phase two consisted of two sessions in the SIL: the first being a 
two-day human factors evaluation in June of 2002; and the second being an NFIMP 
system familiarization course in January of 2003. Two reports were generated from the 
sessions: the first was a human factors evaluation interim report following the 2002 
evaluation (Aerospace Engineering Test Establishment [AETE], 2002) and the second 
was a feedback report following the 2003 familiarization course (AETE, 2003). While 
these reports were presented to both the contractor and the sponsor, very little action was 
taken at the time. Lim, Long and Hancock (1992) refer to this as the too little, too late 
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phenomenon. An in-depth human factors analysis did not occur until the evaluation stage 
at which point many of the issues raised were determined either to be too costly and time 
consuming (too late) or any proposed solutions to the issues were nominal ones that did 
not sufficiently resolve the overriding concerns (too little). The sponsor was hesitant to 
pay for any significant changes that would delay the program and that would likely still 
require additional modifications after the flight tests were completed. The contractor was 
hesitant to change anything without additional funding. As a result, the reports assisted 
the test team in the creation of the flight test plan and the development of the test cards 
but did little to correct perceived design flaws early in the program. The test team made 
certain that the points raised in the preliminary evaluations were assessed airborne to 
either re-enforce these initial observations or to disprove them.  
SIL Description 
The SIL was a mock-up of the NFIMP systems for the pilots side of the CP140 
flight deck and is shown in Fig. 4-1. The SIL included the EFDI, EHSI, DCP, Radar 
Altimeter (RADALT), TCAS, ACP and the Control Display Unit (CDU). The layout was 
not representative of the CP140 flight deck. 
From the test team perspective, the value of the SIL was in its realistic modeling 
of the prototype systems, which facilitated learning the new functionality, allowed for 
hands on training, and provided early insight into any characteristics that might be 
undesirable in a flight environment. The NFIMP flight instruments and displays in the 
SIL were identical to those that were installed in the aircraft, albeit in a different 
configuration. Another advantage of the SIL was the ability to test not only the individual  
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Figure 4.1. CP140 SIL. 
A mock-up of the pilots displays and controls to include the EFDI, EHSI, DCP, CDU 
and the ACP at the Systems Integration Laboratory. The layout of the SIL was not 
representative of the cockpit layout in the aircraft. 
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components or sub-components but also the interfaces and interactions between the 
systems.  
In the SIL, the systems under test were evaluated using both simulation and 
stimulation. This was significant and allowed the test team to evaluate not only the 
functionality of the systems through software manipulation (simulation) but also the 
operation of the genuine hardware components (stimulation). Simulation was performed 
when either the component itself or the signals, inputs and interfaces to the component 
were simulated through software. Stimulation was performed when the components of a 
system or its interactions with other systems were stimulated by the actual external 
inputs.  
Statically, the SIL was able to stimulate the systems by interconnecting the actual 
aircraft equipment. For example, it was possible to operate the EFDI using the same 
inputs, interfaces, cabling and subcomponents that would be used on the aircraft. This 
meant that the EFDI was receiving inputs from the aircraft embedded GPS/INS (EGI) 
system (including a real-time global positioning system feed), the aircraft air data 
computer system, etc. This allowed the contractor and test team to fully evaluate the 
integration of all the systems in the SIL, significantly mitigating the program risk prior to 
flight test. A limitation of this configuration was that it could not be used in a dynamic 
flight environment. For example, when flying the SIL, the EGI platform was static 
and did not provide the flight displays with changes in aircraft heading and attitude 
information. In order to evaluate the systems in a dynamic flight environment, the 
NFIMP inputs in the SIL had to be simulated. It was important that the SIL be able to 
both stimulate all of the components in a static ground environment as well as simulate 
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the integration of systems while airborne to evaluate the functionality in a dynamic 
flight environment.  
The ability of the SIL to both stimulate and simulate the NFIMP systems 
highlighted both the advantages and the limitations of the SIL. In practical terms, one of 
the main advantages of the SIL was the opportunity for the hands on application of the 
written procedures. The SIL also provided the sensory feedback to the test pilots that 
could not be obtained from reading the manuals, such as the tactile feedback of 
depressing a pushbutton. In addition, a significant advantage of the SIL was that it 
allowed for an in-depth fault analysis. The test team was able to pull circuit breakers and 
induce system failures to observe the system response and resultant feedback to the crew. 
The SIL also provided a valuable training environment for the flight testers to interact as 
a team and to develop crew procedures. This was an important objective and enhanced 
the safety of the test program. An additional benefit of testing at the SIL was that it 
brought together the flight testers and the design engineers. This created a forum for 
discussing design philosophy and in many cases created a direct feedback loop to the 
engineers when a system did not function as expected. The majority of the engineers did 
not fly on the test flights and did not have the operational insight of the test pilots. The 
SIL therefore provided a unique opportunity for the design engineers to validate their 
understanding of flight operations with the aircrew and to ensure that the implementation 
of their design met the desired objectives. Overall, the SIL provided an essential link 
between the instruction manuals and the operational use of the system.  
One additional benefit of the SIL was the information transfer that occurred 
between the theoretical and visual domains. As stated in the famous proverb A picture is 
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worth a thousand words (Barnard, 1921), the SIL allowed the test team to visualize what 
was written in the system descriptions. For example, the SIL allowed the test team to 
evaluate the suitability of a size 14-font annunciation on a 4-inch display panel. In 
another case, the readability of a yellow caution annunciation was evaluated against a 
light blue background. Furthermore, the SIL showed how each subsystem was linked 
together and what information was displayed on each sub-page or screen. In summary, 
above all other benefits, the SIL training and evaluation helped to build the confidence of 
the test team that the NFIMP systems were mature, safe and ready for flight test. 
Despite the usefulness of the SIL in preparing the test team for flight test, there 
were also some inherent limitations. One of the greatest shortcomings of the SIL was the 
fact that it was not a realistic representation of the CP140 Aurora cockpit. The SIL was 
not a replication of the Aurora flight deck but simply a panel with the new NFIMP 
systems and office chairs for crew seating. As a result, multiple human factors evaluation 
criteria such as reach and vision (readability, parallax) could not be assessed. 
Furthermore, the NFIMP systems in the SIL were not oriented in the same way or 
situated at the same location as they were in the CP140 cockpit. This prevented the test 
team from assessing the layout and any related human factors issues, such as workload. A 
third major drawback to the SIL was the simulated flight environment, which prevented 
the evaluation of many operational tasks and the subsequent task workload analysis. 
While an understandable limitation of the SIL, the low fidelity flight simulator 
professional software was not a challenging or realistic flight environment. It was for 
these reasons that the final decisions on system compliance and a comprehensive human 
factors evaluation needed to take place in flight.  
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Phase Three  Aircraft Flight Test 
 Phase three of the test program to evaluate the cockpit upgrade to the CP140 
Aurora aircraft was the airborne flight test itself. This was the culmination of years of 
hard work by the contractor as well as extensive planning and preparations on the part of 
the DND and the flight test team. Phase three was the final assessment where every detail 
of the design would either be signed off as acceptable or rejected as a deficiency 
requiring further modification. The test team could now be definitive in their assessments 
after having finally observed the systems in an operational and dynamic flight 
environment. It should be noted that no changes were made to the NFIMP design 
following phases 1 and 2 of the test program, despite numerous recommendations. This 
was a decision made by the project office and not the preferred choice of the test team. 
 The airborne testing of the CP140 NFIMP systems followed a well-defined and 
scripted test plan (CMC Electronics Inc., 2004). The minimum flight crew consisted of 
two pilots, one Test Director and one data engineer. The Test Director, who was either a 
Flight Test Engineer or a Flight Test Navigator, controlled and orchestrated the test flight 
through the use of previously developed test cards. The test pilot flew the test points 
listed on the test cards and provided detailed comments on the ability of the systems to 
meet the test criteria.  
 Each of the test flights were restricted to six hours in accordance with the 
Canadian Forces Flight Test Orders (AETE, 2001), which meant that flights generally 
consisted of four hours of flight test plus transit time to and from the test area. All test 
points adhered to a build up approach methodology whereby test points would always 
begin with the most basic of manoeuvres and increase in intensity and complexity. This 
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building block approach was employed system-by-system before assessing the 
integration of multiple systems as a whole. Human factors engineering and analysis were 
intrinsic parts of every test point and every aspect of the airborne flight evaluation. All 
test cards included a place to record the subjective comments and recommendations of 
the test pilot while executing each test point. The goal was to efficiently accomplish the 
test points in the safest and most expeditious manner, and anything that hindered this 
objective was recorded for subsequent discussion and analysis.  
 After each test flight, the test pilots discussed any observations with the test team 
to determine the significance of the comments. Any potential deficiencies that arose from 
the discussion were then evaluated in terms of the mission and role of the aircraft. For 
example, a quirk that was observed on a system sub-page was assessed against any 
impact on the safe or effective completion of the intended task. The reason for this was 
that if a noted deficiency had a minimal impact on the operations of the aircraft, then the 
severity of the deficiency would be downgraded and sometimes was disregarded 
altogether. If required, the test team would reference the human factors engineering 
guidance manuals for clarification or for a deeper analysis of the deficiency. These 
observations, discussion and analysis were then documented in a post flight report (PFR). 
PFRs were written for each and every flight by the test pilots and flight test engineers.  
In addition to writing the PFRs, the test team submitted problem reports (PRs) 
through the project office to the contractor. These were reports that described what the 
test team perceived to be potential deficiencies. It allowed the test team and the 
contractor to track potential problems through a database that could be subsequently 
referenced to avoid recording duplicate snags, or deficiencies. It also served as a 
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configuration management tool to track the status of each snag and to note any efforts 
made towards resolution of the snag. The data from the PR database and the data from 
the PFRs were the primary sources of information for the description and analysis of the 
deficiencies discussed in this paper. 
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Chapter 5  Results and Discussion 
General 
 The findings presented in this chapter are primarily based upon the observations 
and expertise of the test pilots and flight test members that were tasked to evaluate a 
partial glass cockpit upgrade to the CP140 aircraft. Numerous deficiencies were 
identified through the comments and critiques of the test team. Often these deficiencies 
were singled out due to their propensity to cause human errors, or in the opinion of the 
test team, they would significantly increase the probability of a human error. The purpose 
of this chapter is to analyze these deficiencies from a human factors stand point to 
uncover underlying causal factors that could lead to or contribute to human errors. Once 
identified, potential solutions are offered based upon the same human factors engineering 
principles that were used to highlight the deficiencies.  
Deficiency One  Autopilot and Flight Director (AFDS) Loss of signal 
Results 
The feedback to the pilots of a loss of signal when the AFDS was engaged and 
coupled to a navigation source was unclear and created confusion. From the signals 
given, the pilot was unable to quickly and correctly interpret the information provided on 
the EFDI so as to effect the appropriate actions in a timely manner. In addition, the 
feedback was not always immediately perceived by the pilot, which compounded any 
problems created by the signals lack of clarity. 
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When coupled, the AFDS could fly the aircraft using a navigational aid as the 
guidance source. The EFDI was the pilots primary flight display and presented the status 
of AFDS modes to the pilot in his primary field of view (see Figure 5.1).  
Whenever the AFDS was coupled to a navigational aid and the signal was 
temporarily or permanently lost, the indication to the pilot was a flashing green 
annunciation on the EFDI. The reasons for the lost signal varied from normal operations 
(such as a station overflight and the subsequent passage of the navigational aid) to 
degraded AP modes or system failures. Regardless of the reason for the loss of signal, it 
was difficult for the pilot to distinguish between the initial capture of a navigational 
source, a normal but temporary loss of signal and a permanent loss of signal due to a 
degraded mode or failure state. The problems associated with this design are discussed 
below. 
Discussion 
 For ease of explanation, the TACAN navigational aid will be referred to 
extensively as one example that illustrates several of the issues that arose concerning the 
operator-machine interface between the pilot and his primary flight display (EFDI) with 
reference to the AFDS navigation status. During testing, there was confusion in the 
cockpit when the annunciation for the coupled navigation mode began to flash on the 
EFDI. The flashing alone was an ambiguous signal that did not clearly alert the pilot to 
the current autopilot state. As a result of this ambiguous signal, the pilot was unsure what 
the autopilot would do next and therefore would either fail to respond to the degraded 
mode of operation or would respond too late. In many cases, the aircraft diverged from  
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Figure 5.1. CP140 EFDI showing the AP and FD System status.  
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the desired track and required the pilot to intervene to prevent an unsafe situation from 
developing.  
 The sub-paragraphs below describe the four scenarios that caused a green TCN 
indicator to flash.  
1. Initial Capture. A green TCN illuminated and flashed for five seconds on the 
EFDI when the following two requirements were met: first, the navigation mode 
had to be selected on the ACP; and second, the TACAN radial was captured for 
the first time. This indicated to the pilot that the autopilot had successfully 
captured the signal and would now track the desired course. 
2. Temporary interruption of signal. During a temporary interruption of the 
navigational signal, the indication to the pilot of this modal state on the EFDI was 
also a flashing green TCN annunciation. This situation was especially common on 
the CP140 aircraft because of the way the TACAN antennas worked. On most 
aircraft, a temporary loss of signal would be a rare occurrence but on the CP140 it 
was common, particularly while manoeuvring gently within the terminal area. 
There were two TACAN antennas on the CP140, one on the upper fuselage and 
one on the lower fuselage. There was no automatic switching matrix and therefore 
the pilots had to manually select the top or bottom antenna. A temporary loss of 
signal was normally, but not always, corrected by selecting the alternate antenna. 
When the green TCN signal began to flash, the AFDS transitioned into the 
heading hold mode, which was a dead-reckoning mode. The fact that the AFDS 
was then operating in a heading hold mode was not annunciated on the EFDI (or 
anywhere else in the cockpit). Simultaneously, the AFDS attempted to reacquire 
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the lost signal as if the navigation mode had just been armed but this was not 
communicated to the pilot either. The TCN annunciation would continue to flash 
until the signal was recaptured. If it could be immediately determined that the 
signal loss was due to an incorrect antenna selection, the signal was quickly 
regained and the AFDS was able to recapture the signal and the aircraft continued 
to track towards or away from the station. Whenever the signal could not be 
immediately regained, however, the AFDS failed to recapture the signal and the 
aircraft would diverge from the desired track with no warning provided to the 
crew. Since the indication for loss of signal was the same as the indication for 
signal capture, several seconds would pass as the pilots assessed the potential 
causes of the flashing green TCN annunciation. The time required to analyse the 
causes of the flashing green TCN annunciations was such that the aircraft had 
drifted sufficiently far off track to prevent the AFDS from re-acquiring the 
selected TACAN source. This situation was further complicated by the fact that a 
station overflight (discussed in paragraph 3 below) was annunciated in exactly the 
same way as the temporary loss of signal. For the pilot, it was impossible to 
distinguish between these three events. 
3. Station Overflight. Station overflight was a normal occurrence and is common to 
all aircraft and navigational aids. Station overflight is a phenomenon that modern 
avionics systems are designed to accommodate, including the CP140 AFDS. One 
of the problems with the design on the CP140, however, was an unclear indication 
of this state to the pilots, which led to confusion with other modes. There was a 
cone of confusion where the bearing information was unavailable as the aircraft 
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overflew the navigational station. This was essentially an area directly above the 
station that formed the shape of a cone with the station being the focal point of the 
bottom. The diameter of this cone was dependent upon the aircraft altitude and 
therefore the higher the aircraft altitude, the greater the distance from the station 
the aircraft would be when the signal was lost. The cone could range anywhere 
from 60 to 110 degrees, depending on the ground station and would be 12nm in 
diameter at 36,000 ft (DND, 2003c). While in the cone of confusion the AFDS 
transitioned to the heading hold mode. Similar to the temporary loss of signal 
described in subparagraph 2 above, the fact that the AFDS was now operating in a 
degraded heading hold mode was not annunciated to the pilot on the EFDI, nor 
anywhere in the cockpit. The sole indication to the pilot that anything had 
changed was a flashing green TCN annunciation, which could have indicated any 
one of a number of modal states. During the flight test trials, when the aircraft 
passed through the cone of confusion, the AFDS was sometimes able to recapture 
the desired track on the other side of the station but at other times it was not.  
4. Component failure. When a component failure of the TACAN occurred, the 
indication to the pilot on the EFDI was a flashing green TCN annunciation. A 
failure in this instance could be characterized by any number of failures 
associated with the navigation source. Some examples would be the failure of the 
power source to the receiver, a popped circuit breaker, an incorrect channel 
dialled into the control head or a faulty antenna. 
 When the design methodology for the flashing annunciator was assessed from a 
human factors perspective, several undesirable characteristics were revealed. First, the 
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annunciation to alert the pilot that there was a loss of signal was the same annunciation 
used to inform the pilot of a positive mode capture. The system failed to distinguish 
between these two significant and very different events. It is critical that pilots are able to 
discriminate between different autopilot modal states, particularly ones that are 
cautionary in nature and result in unexpected aircraft guidance. Palmer et al. (1995) state 
Status indications should permit the flight crew to quickly and easily distinguish 
between normal and non-normal situations. This was not possible when different control 
states provided the same, or similar, feedback to the pilot. In addition, it was not possible 
using the CP140 autopilot modal display feedback for the pilot to differentiate between 
the different scenarios outlined in sub-paragraphs 2, 3 and 4 listed above. Knowing the 
cause of the loss of signal (temporary interruption, station over-flight or component 
failure) would enhance the pilots situational awareness and could alter his response.  
 Second, the annunciation to alert the pilot to a degraded mode of operations was 
green, which in this case, was the fact that the autopilot was no longer tracking the 
selected navigation source. Federal Aviation Regulations (U.S. Department of 
Transportation, n.d.) and Canadian Aviation Regulations (Transport Canada, 2002) spell 
out the guidelines for the use of colour coding in glass display systems. Similarly, the US 
Department of Defence military standards specify a colour-coding scheme for use in 
visual displays in which green indicates a fully operational system (Helander, 1987). In 
simple terms, green, yellow and red are the most well defined colours in use in visual 
displays. Green should be consistently used to denote good, yellow to denote caution 
and red to denote danger. After discussing the use of colour in aviation displays, 
Aragon and Hearst (2005) state that these color meanings are conventional and widely 
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accepted in the aviation world (p. 444). After discussing the various regulations 
concerning colour conventions, Don Harris (2004) summarizes them by saying in 
general, green is good, red is bad and yellow is potentially bad! (p. 74). 
Considering these regulations and reports, green was a poor choice to indicate to the pilot 
that the AP had shifted into a reversionary mode. The fact that the AP had, on its own, 
transitioned into a degraded mode of operations reflected an abnormal state and the pilot 
should have been quickly and accurately advised of this critical change. A more 
appropriate colour to notify the pilot of the failure of the navigation source, a loss of 
signal due to a station over-flight or a temporary interruption of the signal would be 
yellow. 
 Third, the annunciation to the pilot lacked sufficient detail regarding the cause of 
the change in status. This was especially true due to the fact that the change in status was 
not commanded by the pilot but rather was a mode reversion due to the loss of the 
guidance signal. Therefore, it was important to provide salient data regarding the signal 
loss to the pilot in an unambiguous and easy to understand format. Palmer et al. (1995) 
discuss the importance of situational awareness obtained from the displays and stress that 
the flight crew should always have access to information about what the various on-
board systems are doing and that access should be appropriate to the current pilot 
responsibilities (p. 24). This additional information would provide the pilot with 
enhanced situational awareness and prevent the pilot from looking elsewhere inside the 
flight deck, searching for clues as to the cause of the apparent failure. Since the pilots 
response is dependent upon the cause of the reversionary mode, this information is 
especially important. For example, if coupled to a TACAN navigation source, a 
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temporary interruption to the signal would cause the pilot to immediately select the 
alternate antenna. In the case of the station over-flight, the pilot would either increase his 
monitoring time on the EFDI (to see if the autopilot recaptured the desired outbound 
radial) or switch to the heading select mode (to steer the aircraft onto a new outbound 
radial). A failure of the receiver itself would result in the pilot selecting an alternate 
navigation mode. There is a balance between providing too much information, which can 
also cause problems (Wickens et al., 1995) and providing concise and salient cues to the 
pilot to ensure adequate situational awareness and an appropriate and timely response 
(Sarter et al., 1995). 
 Finally, a flashing signal was not always sufficient on its own to draw the pilots 
attention to a mode change. There is an inherent trust that is afforded to automated 
systems. Automation complacency can set in as a result and the monitoring of these 
automated systems during extended periods of time and can result in a vigilance 
decrement or an increase in response time (Masalonis et al., 1999). A vigilance 
decrement is the term used to describe a decline in the detection rate of critical signals 
with increased time on task. Nikolic et al. (2005) argue that the onset or flashing of a 
display element to capture a pilots attention and advise him of a mode transition is not 
always successful. This is partly due to the data rich, event driven environment of 
aviation displays as well as the difficulty in capturing a pilots attention when his 
attention may be focused on another task. Visual onsets may be effective when they 
appear in isolation and in the context of spartan displays and tasks, however, they do not 
seem to be sufficiently salient to capture attention when pilots are already engaged in 
some other attention-demanding tasks (Nikolic et al., 2001, p. 5.A.3-2). While the 
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flashing display element was a good way to signal a mode transition, it was insufficient 
on its own. Other methods that could assist in capturing the pilots attention would be the 
use of colour changes, attention cueing in multiple locations and auditory signals. 
 There were several human factors problems associated with the annunciation of a 
loss of signal to the AFDS. These were ambiguous cues, poor use of colour logic, 
insufficient information during uncommanded mode changes and a lack of attention 
capture cueing. The current design provided limited information to the pilot to make 
timely decisions and ensure adequate situational awareness. The outcome could be a 
delayed response, or in the event the cue was missed, no response at all. Some of the 
potential consequences could include an ineffective instrument approach, an excursion 
out of protected airspace or even a collision into terrain, as occurred in the crash of a 
Boeing 757 aircraft near Cali, Columbia in 1995 (NTSB, 1995).  
 The preceding paragraphs have identified the underlying cause factors for 
potential errors related to the AFDS as an inability to easily discern between different 
modal states (ambiguous information), misleading colour coding of the display element, a 
lack of salient information to the pilot during status changes and insufficient methods of 
alerting the pilot to reversionary modes.  
Recommendations 
 The use of a green display element to alert the pilot to a failed or reversionary 
autoflight mode was deemed unacceptable by the flight test team. Using the same 
annunciations to represent different modal states was also deemed unacceptable. The 
reasons or causes for the change of status of the autoflight mode must be readily apparent 
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to the pilot. The pilot must be able to quickly and easily perceive any change in the status 
of the autopilot mode during all flight regimes. These are not deficiencies that can be 
addressed through training or the strict use of standard operating procedures. Therefore, 
the operator machine interface between the EFDI and the AFDS to reflect the loss of 
signal of a navigation source should be redesigned. The first change in the redesign 
should be to implement unique status indications on the pilots primary flight display, for 
each autopilot mode or sub-mode, to ensure that no two modes could be confused. The 
second change should be the inclusion of supplemental information during status changes 
to allow the pilot to identify the correct reversionary mode. A modification such as this 
would provide the pilot with excellent situational awareness and allow him to make the 
right decisions and take the appropriate actions. Any additional information would need 
to be succinct but would have the added benefit of distinguishing different modal states. 
In addition, the colour schema should be re-examined. Given appropriate supplemental 
information, green could be an acceptable colour during certain status changes such as a 
station overflight. During reversionary modes, however, yellow would be a more suitable 
colour choice, and during any failure modes, red would be the most appropriate colour. 
Finally, auditory cueing should be considered an indispensable component of any 
autopilot system, especially during degraded operations. Voice cueing and unique tones 
for autopilot use are standard features in the commercial aviation industry. The addition 
of an aural cueing system on the CP140 autopilot and flight director system would 
provide the additional safeguards required for the demanding military operations required 
of this platform and ensure that a change in modal status would not be missed by any of 
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the flight deck occupants. All of these recommendations are supported by common 
systems that are employed in commercial aviation.  
While advanced and highly automated systems such as the Boeing 777 and Airbus 
A340 provide effective examples, smaller platforms such as the Bombardier Challenger 
CL604 aircraft also employ these same human factors principles. In the CL604, if a 
signal were lost, the autopilot would revert into a dead reckoning mode of heading hold 
and attitude hold. The annunciation would change from green to white to indicate the 
system was no longer following the desired course and would be accompanied by an 
appropriate aural tone. In addition, a large X would appear in the course window and a 
red navigation flag would be present. During a station overflight, the system would 
simply stay in the selected navigation mode and would be capable of reacquiring the 
desired outbound track. During a degraded mode such as a system failure, the autopilot 
would disengage, accompanied by a cavalry charge aural tone and a slew of red failure 
flags (Captain Dave Scott, personal communication, February 21, 2007). This feedback 
design would be sufficient for the pilot to quickly determine the correct autopilot modal 
state and maintain a satisfactory level of situational awareness.  
Deficiency Two  Automatic Flight Control System (AFCS) Disengagement 
General  
 During the flight test program there were several deficiencies regarding the 
disengagement of the AFCS, or autopilot (AP). The deficiencies related to indications of 
both normal and non-normal disengagements of the AP. There were multiple methods of 
disengaging the AFCS and each could be categorized in one of two ways: normal or non-
  57 
 
normal disengagements. Recall that the only method of achieving a normal 
disengagement of the AP was by depressing the autopilot disconnect switch on the outer 
horn of the pilot or co-pilot control wheel to the second detent (the first detent 
temporarily disengaged the altitude hold mode) as shown in Figure 5.2. 
 A non-normal, or abnormal, disengagement was achieved by either depressing 
the AP engage pushbutton on the AFDS control panel (Figure 3.1), pulling the AP 
emergency disconnect handle (Figure 5.3) or by any number of system failures or 
malfunctions. 
 
 
 
Figure 5.2. Automatic Flight Control System Disconnect Switches. 
Top view of CP140 control wheels showing pilot and co-pilot autopilot disconnect 
switches. 
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Figure 5.3. AP emergency disconnect handle. 
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During the test program, the test pilots commented that it was not always clear 
that the AP had been disconnected and there were opportunities for confusion following 
either a normal or non-normal disengagement. Specifically, sometimes the normal 
disconnects were missed and the non-normal disconnects were ambiguous. This resulted 
in a lack of situational awareness and uncertainty, often during a critical phase of flight.  
Results 
Normal Disengagement 
 A normal disengagement was commanded by either the pilot or co-pilot through 
the disconnect switch on their respective control wheels. The only feedback to the pilot or 
co-pilot on the EFDI of a normal disengagement was the disappearance of the green AP 
symbol (Figure 5.4 and Figure 5.5). 
 
 
Figure 5.4. CP140 EFDI showing AFDS status prior to AP disengagement. 
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Figure 5.5. CP140 EFDI showing AFDS status following AP disengagement. 
 
Non-Normal Disengagement 
 A non-normal disengagement referred to a disengagement of the AP by any 
means other than the pilot or co-pilot control wheel disconnect switches. These non-
normal disengagements included depressing the AP ENGAGE pushbutton on the ACP 
(could be done from either the pilot or co-pilot seat), actuation of the AP emergency 
disconnect handle (from the pilot seat or flight engineer seat) or any number of system 
failures or malfunctions such as a miscompare between the two AP channels or a failure 
of the AP power source. A non-normal disengagement was indicated by a flashing of the 
AP and radar altimeter warning lights (referred to as the AFCS/RAAWS warning lights) 
in addition to the disappearance of the green AP display element. The AFCS/RAAWS 
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warning lights had a dual purpose: They were warning flashers to indicate a non-normal 
disengagement of the AP in addition to providing altitude warnings associated with the 
radar altimeter system. These lights are discussed in more detail below. See Figures 5.6 
and 5.7 for the location of the AFCS/RAAWS warning lights on the pilot and co-pilot 
instrument panels. 
Discussion 
Normal Disengagement 
 The flight deck indications of a normal autopilot disengagement were subtle and 
could be missed by the non-flying pilot if he were distracted, pre-occupied with another 
task or was experiencing a decreased state of situational awareness. The disappearance of 
a small AP display element was not easily noticed unless the operator was directly 
focused on the display and in some cases, even direct attention failed to pick up the 
disappearance of the small symbol. Recall from Chapter 2 that Wickens et al. (1989) 
discuss the dangers associated with the absence of cues as a form of modal feedback by 
pointing out that the people will more easily notice an active annunciation rather than 
observe the absence of something. (p. 122).  
 One of the primary roles of the non-flying pilot is to provide back up for the 
flying pilot, so it is critical that both pilots maintain a high level of situational awareness 
at all times. Having both pilots in the loop and cognizant of the current state of the 
aircraft is a critical aspect of the safe operation of a multi-crew platform. In discussing 
human error in aviation, David Nagel (1989) refers to a comprehensive analysis of 
aircraft accidents over a 24-year period that was conducted by R.L. Sears in 1986. The 
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Figure 5.6. Pilots instrument panel equipment layout showing the AFCS/RAAWS 
warning lights in the top left hand corner. 
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Figure 5.7. Co-pilots instrument panel equipment layout showing the AFCS/RAAWS 
warning lights in the top right corner. 
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analysis showed that an inadequate crosscheck by the second crewmember was a 
significant cause factor in 26 percent of the accidents. Crew related issues were 
attributable to 51 percent of the cause factors. Billings (1981) examined more than 
12,000 flight incidents where a problem in the transfer of information involving flight 
deck members was implicated in 73 percent of the incidents. These and other studies are 
evidence that it is critical that all members of the flight deck are aware at all times of the 
status of the aircraft, particularly when using automated systems as was illustrated by the 
crash of the L1011 aircraft into the Florida everglades in 1972. As a result, most 
commercial systems use both visual and aural means of notifying the pilot of an autopilot 
disengagement, including the system used on the CL604 Challenger as well as the system 
used on the A310 Airbus (Captain Steve Chalkley and Captain Dario Rossi, personal 
communication, February 13, 2007). 
Non-Normal Disengagement  
 A non-normal disengagement could result from one of two things: either an 
uncommanded disconnect due to a system malfunction; or, an operator commanded 
emergency disconnect as described in the aircraft operating instructions manual (DND, 
2003b). From a human factors perspective, a flashing red eyebrow light would generally 
be considered an acceptable method of advising the flight crew of a potential emergency 
situation. There were two problems, however, with the use of the AFCS/RAAWS 
warning lights as the primary mechanism to alert the flight deck to an emergency 
situation. One problem was that the red warning lights flashed when the pilot disengaged 
the autopilot using the AP ENGAGE pushbutton on the ACP. The second, and more 
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significant issue, was that the red AFCS/RAAWS warning lights would flash for multiple 
non-emergency related reasons and this would occur on a regular basis.  
 The CP140 flight manual categorized autopilot disconnects into normal and non-
normal conditions. A non-normal disengagement did not always equate to an emergency 
situation and yet always elicited a red flashing annunciation for a response. The 
annunciations for an emergency should be unique to the situation and easily discernible 
by the pilot. This philosophy is inline with standard human factors principles (Salvendy, 
2006) and corresponds to industry standards that are employed on such aircraft as the 
CL604 Challenger (Captain Dario Rossi, personal communication, February 13, 2006).  
The second issue of using the same red flashing lights to alert the pilot to both a 
non-critical and critical situation is a more serious one. In addition to alerting the crew to 
a non-normal AFDS disengagement, the AFCS/RAAWS flashers would flash in the 
following circumstances: 
1. An altitude deviation of more than 60 feet when in the altitude hold mode; 
2. Any time the aircraft descended through an altitude preset on the radar 
altimeter; 
3. Each time the aircraft descended below 400 feet (ft) above ground level 
(AGL) with the landing gear up and locked; and, 
4. Continuously below 200 ft AGL when the landing gear was up and locked. 
In addition, for operational sorties the CP140 Aurora standard operating 
procedures (SOPs) demanded setting the radar altimeter warning pointer at multiple step 
down altitudes for every descent (and there were many descents during each operational 
mission). The result was the frequent illumination of the RAAWS flashers during each 
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flight. Furthermore, false warnings from the sensors were noted to be a relatively 
common event. The result was that the pilots had become so desensitized to the warning 
flashers that their illumination was not seen as an emergency situation and was often not 
even cause for alarm. In a recent CP140 flight safety incident (FSIS, 2005), a crew 
observed the illumination of both the pilot and co-pilot RAAWS flashers while 
descending into an area they believed to be over water. Both pilots noticed the warning 
indicators but continued to descend, believing them to be false warnings. The flying pilot 
caught a glimpse of some trees through a break in the clouds, realized they were over 
land and immediately initiated a climb. They were flying in mountainous terrain and the 
incident could have easily resulted in a controlled flight into terrain accident. In a 
separate flight safety incident (FSIS, 1997) a crewmember from the aft portion of the 
aircraft averted a crash when he alerted the pilots to the aircraft altitude of 120 ft ASL. 
The pilots were flying operationally at night in a steep turn and did not realize that the 
autopilot had become disconnected and that they were descending, even though both of 
the eyebrow warning lights were flashing. While the flashing lights are significantly more 
effective than no lights at all, they are insufficient in their current implementation. Palmer 
et al. (1995) are clear in their design philosophy that different alerts should sound and 
appear dissimilar and that critical alerts should be presented aurally, since sounds dont 
require directed attention (p. 29). Flanagan et al. (1998) point out additional advantages 
of an auditory system in that they essentially offer an unlimited field of view (p. 1). 
 The lack of a unique auditory warning system for the emergency disengagement 
of the autopilot on the CP140 is an unacceptable situation. Incidentally, the legacy system 
had an auditory signal associated with the disengagement of the autopilot, albeit 
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unintentional. A number of studies have focused upon the use of auditory enhancements 
for visual displays. Early research has indicated that subjects attend to auditory warning 
signals faster than visual warnings and it has been suggested that auditory warning 
signals are particularly useful for situations in which the visual system is overburdened 
(Dry et al., 2005, p. 15). Nikolic et al. (2004) clearly submit that aviation flight displays 
are heavily saturated and argue this is one of the reasons why pilots sometimes miss alert 
cueing.  
Recommendation 
Normal Disengagement 
 The elimination of any ambiguity associated with the normal disengagement of 
the autopilot could be accomplished in a variety of ways. The recommended solution is 
the addition of an auditory cueing system. The addition of unique and distinguishable 
tones or word phrases to alert all members of the flight deck to the fact that the autopilot 
is no longer flying the aircraft would be ideal. An alternate but inferior solution would be 
to embed a procedural requirement for the flying pilot to clearly articulate to the crew 
when the autopilot is being disconnected. One of the limitations to such a solution is that 
it would still fail to warn the crew in the event of an inadvertent disconnect, as was the 
case in the L1011 crash into the everglades (NTSB, 1972). There are also tangible 
benefits to minimizing the number of rules, regulations and procedures that the crews are 
required to remember. This relates to the basic human limitations of memory and 
cognitive processing. Furthermore, the CP140 has seven radios onboard and their 
operations dictate frequent communication. As a result, anything that can be done to 
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minimize transmissions on the intercommunications system on the CP140 should be done 
whenever possible. The best option to correct this deficiency, therefore, is the 
implementation of an aural cueing system.  
 Non-normal Disengagement 
 The solution offered to correct the issues associated with a normal disengagement 
would also solve the problems associated with a non-normal disengagement. Due to the 
potentially critical nature of an autopilot disengagement and the importance of a timely 
response, an auditory cueing system should be implemented on the CP140 aircraft. Such 
an auditory cuing system should be unique to the autopilot and not represent multiple 
systems, as was the case with the flashing AFCS and RAAWS warning lights. This 
would provide the pilot with sufficient information to determine an appropriate course of 
action and to ensure that there was no confusion amongst all crew members.  
 
Deficiency Three  Unselected Approach Guidance 
Results 
 Early on in the flight test program, it was observed that approach guidance for 
either a precision instrument landing system or a localizer back course approach was 
being displayed on the pilot and co-pilot EFDI displays when the pilots had not made this 
selection on the DCP. This was a clear violation of the basic rule that the human element 
must always know what the automation is doing (Palmer et al., 1995). As well, from the 
test pilots perspective, this was a confusing design and the additional information was 
distracting and often irrelevant. The test team believed this to be a software bug but 
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follow-on discussions with the contractor revealed this to be the design intent. This 
design was a workaround for other system limitations and was meant to assist the flying 
pilot when transitioning from the initial approach segment using the avionics 
management system (or AMS) to the final approach segment of either an ILS or 
LOC(BC) approach. In the NFIMP design, moving the course source selector on the DCP 
from the AMS selection to the VOR selection as the pilot transitioned from the initial 
approach segment to the final approach segment caused a complete disengagement of the 
autopilot, including the illumination of flashing red warning lights. The contractor 
correctly foresaw this to be highly undesirable, especially in a critical phase of flight. As 
a workaround, the system was designed such that anytime an ILS or LOC(BC) frequency 
was dialled into the VOR/ILS control head, indications of glideslope, localizer and 
ILS/LOC(BC) display elements would be sent to the pilot and co-pilot EFDIs (see Figure 
5.8). This would allow the pilot to fly an instrument transition on his EHSI, while still 
receiving ILS guidance on his EFDI for an easy transition to the final approach segment 
(Jim Hastie, personal communication, February, 2005). There are some potential 
implications to this design that will be expounded upon in the discussion below.  
Discussion 
 From a human factors perspective, there were some concerns with a system that 
provided information on a primary flight display that was not commanded by the pilot or 
co-pilot. It is important to note in this discussion that the EFDI was designed to display 
ILS or LOC(BC) information anytime an ILS or LOC(BC) frequency was resident in the 
VOR/ILS control head, regardless of whether or not an ILS or LOC(BC) existed at that  
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Figure 5.8. CP140 EFDI with approach course selected to TCN on the DCP.  
In this screen capture the magenta flight director bars in the center of the EFDI show 
guidance to the TCN station while the magenta diamonds on the left side and bottom of 
the display show guidance to the ILS approach. 
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particular airport. If the receiver was receiving a valid ILS or LOC(BC) signal, then this 
information would be displayed on the EFDI. If the receiver did not receive a signal, the 
EFDI would show a boxed yellow indication to reflect a failed or degraded state (See 
Figure 5.9).  
For example, if the CP140 departed an airfield that had an ILS approach, the ILS 
frequency for the active runway of the departing aerodrome would be input into the 
VOR/ILS control head in the event the aircraft needed to return for landing. The AMS or 
TCN might be selected as the primary source for navigation. On departure, the aircraft 
would display valid, although irrelevant, ILS information on the pilot and co-pilot EFDIs. 
Once the aircraft was out of range of the ILS transmitter, the EFDI would provide 
feedback to indicate a failed or degraded ILS system. This symbology would remain on 
the EFDI enroute to the next airfield. If the subsequent airfield had no ILS approach, the 
failed indications would remain. The only ways to remove the indications from the EFDI 
would be to ensure that there was no ILS or LOC(BC) frequency in the VOR/ILS control 
head or to turn the VOR/ILS receiver off. 
There were two specific problems with this design. The first was that it 
contributed to display clutter, while the second, and more significant problem, was that it 
had the potential to provide confusing and misleading information to the pilots. In their 
chapter on Aviation Displays, Stokes et al. (1988) described in detail many of the 
problems that can arise from information overload in the cockpit (p. 387). There are 
limitations as to the amount of information that humans can process, and in data rich 
environments such as aviation, our visual systems can quickly become overwhelmed. In 
the transition to glass cockpits, designers sometimes go too far in saturating the visual  
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Figure 5.9. CP140 EFDI showing both TACAN and ILS approach symbology.  
In this screen capture the TCN is selected for course guidance. The ILS is not selected 
but is displayed because there is an ILS frequency in the VOR/ILS control head (no valid 
signal). 
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domain simply because the capability exists, without taking into account the cognitive 
repercussions. Wiener (1989) discussed this phenomenon in the context of advanced 
cockpit automation and suggested that the responsibility for resolution ultimately falls 
back in the lap of the human factors practitioners to persuade designers to return to the 
fundamental question: What information does the operator need, and in what form should 
it be displayed? The usefulness of displaying the unselected ILS information would be 
limited to the short period of time as the pilot transitioned from the enroute navigation 
source to the final approach guidance. In all other circumstances, this information would 
be irrelevant. Further studies have shown that close visual clutter can decrease the 
perceptual acuity of other more relevant visual cueing (Wickens et al., 1995). 
The second problem with providing the pilot with unselected approach guidance 
on his primary flight display was that it provided him with confusing and misleading 
information. It failed to ensure the pilot was aware of what active guidance the 
automation was providing and provided negative training to the pilots by conditioning 
them to ignore flight guidance information on their primary flight displays. This negative 
training could create hazardous habit patterns that could result in unsafe acts (Shappell et 
al., 2000). There is a high probability that pilots will make significant errors when they 
learn to ignore information being presented to them, as was manifest in a 2005 CP140 
flight safety incident (FSIS, 2005). Recall that through training procedures and poor 
design, over time the flight crew had become accustomed to ignoring the red flashing 
AFCS/RAAWS warning lights and almost flew the airplane into a mountain (discussed 
under deficiency two, in the discussion section for non-normal disengagements). With the 
complexity of modern displays, it is more critical than ever that any information provided 
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to the pilot be important and relevant information. By teaching pilots that they need to be 
selective about what is important and what can be ignored, the designers are increasing 
the pilots cognitive processing requirements and therefore increasing the probability of 
making errors. Simultaneously displaying guidance to two separate approaches will 
create confusion and ambiguity, and at some point, will result in human error. 
Recommendation 
 The NFIMP prototype that displayed unselected approach guidance on the pilots 
and co-pilots primary flight displays was unacceptable. It is essential that in any design 
the pilot must either directly command the information to be displayed on his primary 
flight display or be clearly advised whenever new information is presented or altered (in a 
fully automated system). If more than one source of guidance is shown, then it must be 
clear what the primary or active guidance system is.  
 There are many ways of creating a safe and effective navigation and approach 
guidance system on a pilots primary flight display. One system that is employed on the 
Fokker 28 aircraft permits the pilot and co-pilot to set up different approach or navigation 
guidance on their individual displays. While the pilot is navigating to the airport using 
one set of navigational tools on the pilot display, the co-pilot sets up the appropriate 
guidance for the instrument approach on the co-pilot display. When the pilot is ready to 
transition over to the instrument approach, there is a capability for the pilot and co-pilot 
to simply swap displays (Major Pete Haggins, personal communication, October 11, 
2006). The CL604 Challenger aircraft has a NAV to NAV transfer functionality whereby 
the pilot can simply tell the Flight Management System that it wants to fly the ILS 
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approach following the current transition. The approach mode needs to be armed and 
when the ILS signal is acquired, the system smoothly transfers over to the ILS approach. 
This can be done manually as well (Captain Dario Rossi, personal communication, 
February, 2007). On the CP140, manually switching the navigation courses would cause 
a complete disengagement of the autopilot, which is unacceptable. The Fokker 28 and the 
CL604 provide just two examples of the many possibilities to overcome this deficiency 
that are being used in industry that are both practical and credible.  
 Regardless of the solution decided upon, it is clear that some form of re-design of 
the system is required. It should only be possible to display one set of approach guidance 
to the pilot at a time. As well, the ILS or LOC(BC) information should only be displayed 
when commanded by the pilot. Any new design should use a human-centered philosophy 
to ensure that the pilot is the focal point of the model.  
 
Deficiency Four  Coupled versus Uncoupled status of the Autopilot and Flight Director 
System (AFDS) 
Results 
 Modal awareness has become an industry wide issue. With the proliferation of 
modes in todays modern flight displays, it is a challenging task to ensure that both pilot 
and co-pilot are always cognizant of the current status of the autoflight mode. While this 
task of ensuring adequate situational awareness is a challenging one, it is also an essential 
one. In all cases, the display should clearly and unambiguously indicate the current 
mode. For critical functions such as flight control, where mode confusions can cause 
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accidents, the mode indications should be given redundantly in several locations and with 
several types of cues (Palmer et al., 1995, p. 24).   
 On multiple occasions during the flight-testing of the AP system, the test pilots 
were unable to identify the correct AP mode by reference to the primary flight display. 
On several occasions the test pilots were also incorrect when describing expected AP 
behaviour. Similar responses were obtained from operational pilots that were placed in 
the seats. The pilots confusion concerning the APs modal state represented what Sarter 
et al. (1997) referred to as automation surprises and could lead to mode errors. Mode 
errors are inherently a human-machine system breakdown, in that it requires that the 
users lose track of which mode the device is in (or confuse which methods or actions are 
appropriate to which mode) (Sarter et al., 1995, p. 6). An example on the CP140 NFIMP 
prototype design that demonstrated this breakdown in modal awareness was the 
determination by the pilot of a coupled or uncoupled AP mode with reference to the 
primary flight display. 
Discussion 
 The AP was always engaged in one of two modes: It was either coupled 
(combinations 2 or 5 from Figure 3.1) or it was uncoupled (combinations 1, 3 or 4 from 
Figure 3.1). The term coupled meant that the AP system was receiving steering guidance 
signals from the AFDC and was, in turn, controlling the movement of the flight control 
surfaces to follow those guidance signals. While in the coupled mode, the AP system was 
flying the airplane independent of the pilots input. The term uncoupled meant that the 
AP was maintaining pitch attitudes and bank angles set by the pilot but was not following 
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any specific steering guidance. In the uncoupled mode, the AP was assisting the pilot but 
was not independently flying the airplane. From a human factors perspective, from a 
safety perspective and from an evaluation perspective, it was essential that the test pilot 
be able to quickly and accurately determine whether the AP was flying the aircraft or not 
with reference to his primary flight display. 
 The coupled and uncoupled AP states were presented in different ways on the 
pilot and co-pilot primary flight displays, depending on which other modes were 
engaged. As a result, a comprehensive understanding of the AP system was required by 
the pilots to interpret the various display combinations. The effect was a relatively high 
level of cognitive activity to grasp what should have been a very intuitive and simple to 
understand annunciation of the current mode. In a series of studies of pilot-automation 
interaction, Sarter et al. (1995) found that most of the observed difficulties were related 
to lack of mode awareness and to gaps in mental models of how the various automated 
modes work and interact (p. 11). In modern cockpits, every effort must be made to keep 
any information provided to the pilot in the simplest and most usable form. This takes 
into account human limitations and is of greatest assistance to the pilot. A display that is 
easy to understand and interpret reduces the number of cognitive tasks required by the 
pilot and reduces the potential for mode errors. This subsequently reduces the probability 
of the pilot committing an error and increases the effectiveness of the overall system. 
The primary flight display was capable of displaying a small bar to indicate a 
coupled state. As well, the ACP had a coupled annunciation. These were designed to 
assist the pilot but their application was not always consistent and therefore the coupled 
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indications were sometimes the cause of the confusion. The five possible AFDS 
combinations (see Table 3.1) are described below.  
When the AP was first engaged, it activated in its most basic mode of heading and 
roll control (combination 1 from Table 3.1 and Figure 5.10). In this mode, the coupled 
bar was not illuminated on the pilots primary flight display (PFD) but it was illuminated 
on the ACP (Figure 3.1). This was inconsistent and would have been more intuitive if 
both indications always reflected the same status. This was interpreted to mean that while 
it was not actively coupled to any outer loop flight guidance, it would couple to the flight 
guidance upon selection of an outer loop, or active guidance, mode.  
 
 
Figure 5.10. CP140 EFDI engaged in the basic AP mode.  
In this screen capture, the autopilot is not coupled to any flight guidance and is simply 
maintaining the pilots last input in pitch and roll attitude. 
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The next AFDS combination was a coupled AP (combination 2 from Table 3.1 
and Figure 5.11) where outer loop modes, such as the TACAN and altitude hold modes, 
had been engaged. Again, the pilots PFD did not reflect the coupled status although the 
AP was, in fact, coupled to the selected flight guidance and the coupled light was 
illuminated on the ACP. 
The third AFDS combination was the FD only (combination 3 from Table 3.1 and 
Figure 5.12). This mode was reasonably straight forward because the AP was not 
engaged and the AFDS was providing manual steering guidance only. The pilot was 
flying the airplane with no assistance from the AP and could follow the guidance of the 
FD bars. As well, the PFD and the ACP were consistent in that neither display showed a 
coupled indication, which made it easier to interpret. 
The fourth AFDS combination included both the AP and the FD in an uncoupled 
state (combination 3 from Table 3.1 and Figure 5.13). This mode also maintained 
consistency between the pilots PFD and the ACP. The trend, however, was one in which 
the absence of the coupled bar sometimes correctly indicated an uncoupled AFDS state 
(combination 1 and 3 from Table 3.1) while at other times the absence of the coupled bar 
was meaningless and the AFDS was, in fact, coupled (combination 2 from Table 3.1). 
The only way to be sure was to check the ACP, which meant the pilot had to look to the 
side and backwards to read the display. This was a poor human factors design as it is 
never good for the pilot to look down and backwards while flying, especially in 
Instrument Meteorological Conditions, as the pilot can become prone to disorientation. 
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Figure 5.11. CP140 EFDI showing the AP engaged and coupled.  
In this screen capture, the AP is engaged and coupled to the TACAN lateral guidance 
mode and the Altitude Hold vertical guidance mode.  The AP is therefore steering the 
aircraft toward the TCN station, even though there is no couple bar. This is understood by 
the combination of an outer loop mode (TCN) with no FD cueing; which together 
indicates that the AP is coupled. 
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Figure 5.12. CP140 EFDI showing FD only. 
In this screen capture, the autopilot is not engaged. When outer loop modes such as the 
TCN and altitude hold modes are selected without the AP, the flight director bars appear 
and provide steering guidance for the pilot to follow.  
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Figure 5.13. CP140 EFDI showing both the AP and FD in an uncoupled state.  
In this screen capture, the AP is engaged but not coupled to the flight guidance, indicated 
by the absence of a couple bar linking the AP and FD symbols. The magenta flight 
director bars provide manual steering guidance to the TCN station (lateral mode) and to a 
defined altitude (vertical mode), but the AP will not command the aircraft to follow.  
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The final combination had the autopilot engaged and coupled, in addition to the 
flight director being on (combination 5 from Table 3.1 and Figure 5.14). Again there was 
consistency between the pilots PFD and the ACP.  
What was problematic in all these cases was that it was impossible to rely solely 
on the pilots PFD to determine the true modal state of the aircraft. Further, the true 
coupled state of the AFDS was not always represented by a coupled bar on the EFDI and 
this inconsistency in the display format created confusion for the pilot. The pilot was 
forced to go through a series of cognitive processes, such as If, then statements to 
determine the actual modal state of the AFDS. Even with the high level of automation in 
advanced cockpits, there is strong consensus that the pilot will continue to be ultimately 
responsible for the safe operation of the aircraft (Billings, 1991). As such, it is essential 
that the pilot be provided with the truth state of the aircraft and be given salient cueing 
following any mode changes to assist the pilot in making sound decisions. 
Another problem the test pilots discovered with the display format of the AP was 
the lack of anticipation cueing. Because the current design made it difficult to determine 
the active mode of the AP system, it became even more difficult to anticipate what the 
aircraft would do next. When the pilots expectations do not match reality, automation 
surprises will occur.  
An additional problem with the display format of the AP was that the 
annunciations on the pilots PFD were always the same green colour (when in the active 
state), regardless of whether it was the autopilot or the flight director that was engaged 
and regardless of whether the autopilot was coupled or uncoupled. Furthermore, 
regardless of the mode, the annunciations always illuminated in the same location. The  
  84 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.14. CP140 EFDI showing both AP and FD in a coupled state.  
In this screen capture, the AP is engaged and coupled to the flight guidance as shown by 
the green couple bar. The FD is also present which increases the pilots situational 
awareness by providing the steering guidance the AP is following. 
 
 
 
 
 
Couple bar 
connecting 
the AP and 
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A white TCN symbol, indicating the aircraft was armed 
to capture the TCN radial. 
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effect was that it was very difficult, at a glance of the pilots PFD, to quickly and 
accurately determine the modal status of the AFDS. Furthermore, the AP coupled bar on 
the AFDS was quite small and because the remaining indications were all so similar, the 
disappearance of the coupled bar from the pilots primary flight display was difficult for 
the pilot to notice without directly looking for it. Recall the observation that People 
simply do not easily notice the absence of things (Wickens et al., p. 122). 
The combination of these problems, or cause factors, could facilitate the 
occurrence of human errors and could easily result in an accident, as happened near 
Bangalore, in southern India, in 1990 (Flight Safety Foundation, 1990). In this Airbus 
A320 accident, both the pilots believed they were in one mode when in fact they were in 
another. The lack of awareness of the correct modal state cost them their lives as well as 
those of 90 others on board the aircraft. This accident demonstrates the critical 
importance of knowing what your aircraft is doing and what it will do next. For this 
reason, it is essential that each and every mode be clearly and unambiguously presented 
to the flight deck crews. 
Recommendation 
The display format to communicate the coupled and uncoupled modal states of 
the AP should be redesigned. Attempting to implement a standard operating procedure to 
overcome this shortcoming will only result in extraneous communications and make an 
already confusing situation more complicated. A new design should incorporate the 
following human factors principles:  
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1. Indications of a coupled or uncoupled state should be consistently 
displayed on the pilots primary flight display throughout all possible 
modal combinations.  
2. The display should provide anticipation cueing. The pilot should be able 
to easily discern the projected flight path before the aircraft actually flies 
it. 
3. The primary flight display should always present truth data. The pilot 
should not have to surmise what various combinations mean to determine 
the correct mode. Nor should the pilot have to look at multiple locations 
within the cockpit to determine the true modal state. The current 
autoflight status should be clearly presented in a single flight management 
area on the primary flight display. 
These modifications should be developed in consultation with pilots using a 
human centered design philosophy. As discussed previously, when the modifications 
have been made, they should be flight tested by qualified test crews in an operationally 
representative environment to ensure they are intuitive and user friendly. 
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Chapter 6  Conclusions and Recommendations 
Overview 
 One of the primary goals of this paper was to demonstrate that deficiencies in 
system design could lead operators to make mistakes that would reduce the safety, 
efficiency or effectiveness of a system. What may have traditionally been classified as 
pilot or human error during an accident investigation might today be attributed to system 
design flaws. The application of human factors engineering during the design phase and 
the involvement of human factors experts at each step of the development process is 
critical to minimizing human error during the operational use of the system. Czaja and 
Nair (2006) argue the importance of early involvement of human factors specialists but 
also recognize there are many reasons why this often does not occur until the evaluation 
stage of the project.  
 The four deficiencies discussed in this paper were raised during the flight test 
evaluation stage of the NFIMP. A summary of the conclusions and recommendation for 
each of these deficiencies is provided below. 
Deficiency One  Autopilot and Flight Director (AFDS) Loss of signal 
Conclusions 
The feedback to the pilots of a loss of signal when the AFDS was engaged and 
coupled to a navigation source was unclear and created confusion. From the signals 
given, the pilot was unable to quickly and correctly interpret the information provided on 
the EFDI so as to effect the appropriate actions in a timely manner. Further, the feedback 
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was not always immediately perceived by the pilot, which compounded any problems 
created by the signals lack of clarity. 
The test pilots identified several human factors problems associated with the 
annunciation of a loss of signal to the AFDS. These problems included ambiguous cues, 
poor use of colour logic, insufficient information during uncommanded mode changes 
and a lack of attention capture cueing. The NFIMP design provided limited information 
to the pilot to make timely decisions and to ensure adequate situational awareness. The 
outcome could result in a delayed response or in the event the cue was missed, no 
response at all. Possible consequences could include an ineffective instrument approach, 
an incursion out of protected airspace or even a collision into high terrain. The underlying 
cause factors for these potential errors were determined to be an inability to easily discern 
between different modal states (ambiguous information), misleading colour coding of the 
display element, a lack of salient information to the pilot during status changes and 
insufficient methods of alerting the pilot to reversionary modes. 
Recommendations 
The operator machine interface between the EFDI and the AFDS reflecting the 
loss of signal of a navigation source should be redesigned. First, unique status indications 
should be implemented on the pilots primary flight display for each autopilot mode or 
sub-mode, to ensure that no two modes could be confused. In addition, supplemental 
information should be included during status changes to allow the pilot to identify the 
correct reversionary mode. This would provide the pilot with excellent situational 
awareness and allow him to make the right decisions and take the appropriate actions. 
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Any additional information would need to be succinct but would provide the added 
benefit of distinguishing different modal states. Further, the colour schema should be re-
examined. Given appropriate supplemental information, green would be an acceptable 
colour during certain status changes such as a station overflight. During reversionary 
modes, yellow would be a more suitable colour choice and during any failure modes, red 
would be the most appropriate colour. Finally, auditory cueing should be considered an 
indispensable component of any autopilot system, especially during degraded operations. 
Voice cueing and unique tones for autopilot use are standard features in the commercial 
aviation industry. The addition of an aural cueing system on the CP140 AP and FD 
system will provide the additional safeguards required for the demanding military 
operations required of this platform and ensure that a change in modal status is not 
missed by any of the flight deck occupants. 
Deficiency Two  Automatic Flight Control System (AFCS) Disengagement 
Conclusions 
Normal disengagements 
The flight deck indications of a normal autopilot disengagement were subtle and 
could be missed. The disappearance of a small AP display element was not easily noticed 
and therefore it was necessary for the aircrew to be directly focused on the EFDI to 
observe the autopilot disconnect annunciation. This was a poor design in an advanced 
cockpit where the pilot was responsible for monitoring multiple displays, operating 
multiple systems and simultaneously carrying out complex mission tasks.  
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Several human factors problems identified by the test pilots were intrinsic within 
this design. There was insufficient modal cueing for the pilot, a lack of attention capture 
cueing and a lack of sufficient information to the flight deck to ensure a high level of 
situational awareness for all crewmembers. It would be possible for one crewmember to 
disengage the AP without the other crewmembers noticing. The resulting gap in 
situational awareness could create confusion in the cockpit and foster different 
expectations of the pilots intentions of the aircraft flight path. An inadvertent disconnect 
could leave both pilots unaware the AP was no longer in control and result in an accident, 
similar to the crash of an Eastern Airlines flight into the Florida everglades in 1972 
(NTSB, 1972). The underlying cause factors for these potential situations were identified 
as a failure to recognize a normal disengagement of the AP (lack of cueing), a breakdown 
in flight deck communications and a loss of situational awareness. 
Non-normal disengagements 
The observed flight deck indications of a non-normal autopilot disengagement 
were incongruent with human factors principles and could lead to a misinterpretation of 
the correct AP state and confusion in the cockpit. Specifically, the same alerting 
mechanisms were used for both emergency and non-emergency situations. This design 
could promote a culture of complacency and could train pilots to ignore critical flight 
deck indications. Some of the issues were as follows: red flashing indications were used 
to alert pilots to non-emergency situations; the pilots were unable to discern between an 
emergency situation and one that was simply non-standard; and there was a distinct lack 
of aural cueing for this critical flight system. 
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The human factors issues identified were a misuse of alert cueing, negative 
training for the pilots, improper use of colour logic and a lack of appropriate aural cues. 
The result could be the misdiagnosis of a critical situation or a failure to respond quickly 
or appropriately to an emergency situation. The flight safety incident in which the CP140 
Aurora crew almost descended into mountainous terrain (FSIS, 2005) is an example of 
how critical this could be. The potential accident cause factors innate in this design were 
identified as an inability to differentiate between critical and non-critical alerts and an 
incorrect use of colour coding for non-emergency alerts. 
Recommendations 
Normal disengagements 
The method of alerting the pilot and co-pilot to a normal AP disengagement 
should be redesigned. The primary recommendation, and one that has become the 
industry standard, is the addition of an auditory cueing system. Furthermore, the same 
alerting mechanism should not be used for multiple systems, as was the case with the 
AFCS and RAAWS warning lights. This will raise the situational awareness of all 
crewmembers, ensure inadvertent disengagements do not go unnoticed and enhance the 
overall safety of flight operations.  
Non-normal disengagements 
The methods used to alert the pilot and co-pilot to a non-normal disengagement 
should also be redesigned. First, a red flashing eyebrow light should not be used to alert 
the flight crew to non-emergency situations. Second, as stated above, the same warning 
system should not be used for multiple systems. Finally and most importantly, due to the 
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potentially critical nature of an AP disengagement, a distinctive auditory cueing system 
should be implemented on the CP140 aircraft.  
 
Deficiency Three  Unselected Approach Guidance 
Conclusions 
 The ability of the NFIMP design to display approach guidance on a primary flight 
display that was not selected by either the pilot or co-pilot was deemed unacceptable. It is 
essential that in any design the pilot must either directly command the information to be 
displayed or, as a minimum, he should be clearly advised whenever new information is 
presented or altered. In the case where more than one source of guidance is shown, it 
must be clear what the primary or active guidance system is. 
 Providing multiple sources of guidance to the pilot on a single display without 
distinguishing the primary or selected guidance would be a source of confusion and 
ambiguity. From a human factors perspective, this design lacked the fundamental 
principle of pilot involvement. As well, it was considered to be a catalyst for negative 
training by conditioning the pilots to ignore flight guidance information on their primary 
flight displays. It also increased display clutter and pilot cognition by requiring the pilots 
to dissect the information on the screen to determine what information to follow and what 
to ignore. This design could result in the pilot trying to fly an invalid approach or to fly 
an approach for which he was not cleared. The display of unselected approach guidance 
could lead to a lack of situational awareness on the flight deck, contribute to confusion in 
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the cockpit during a critical phase of flight, increase the pilots cognitive workload and 
lead to an increase in pilot error. 
Recommendations 
 The NFIMP prototype requires modification to inhibit the display of unselected 
approach guidance to the pilots primary flight display. There are multiple ways of 
accomplishing this task. The Fokker 28 facilitates this capability through the swapping of 
displays while the Challenger 604 permits the aircraft to transition directly from FMS 
guidance onto a traditional approach guidance signal, such as an ILS. Whatever option is 
decided upon, it is clear that some form of re-design of the system is required. It should 
only be possible to display one set of approach guidance to the pilot at a time. Any new 
design should use a human-centered philosophy to ensure that the pilot is the focal point 
of the model. 
 
Deficiency Four  Coupled versus Uncoupled status of the Autopilot and Flight Director 
System (AFDS) 
Conclusions 
 The operator-machine interface between the pilot and the EFDI lacked 
appropriate and salient cueing to clearly communicate the true modal status of the AP. 
The inability of the pilots to correctly identify the AP mode with reference to the primary 
flight displays was unacceptable.  
 The human factors issues related to this deficiency were the provision of 
ambiguous information, a lack of clear indicators of the true modal state of the aircraft, 
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inconsistent display formats and insufficient salient data to enable the pilot to make 
sound decisions in a timely manner. The implication was that a comprehensive 
understanding of the AP system was required to interpret the various display 
combinations. The effect during testing was a higher level of cognitive activity to grasp 
what should have been a very intuitive and simple to understand annunciation of the 
current mode. The ramification was that the test pilots were often incorrect when 
describing expectant AP behaviour. Potential repercussions could range from a lack of 
situational awareness to complete confusion in the cockpit and could culminate in a flight 
safety incident or accident, similar to the 1990 crash of an A320 aircraft near Bangalore, 
India (Flight Safety Foundation, 1990) where both pilots believed they were in one mode 
when in fact they were in another. One of the underlying cause factors in such an 
accident would be the inability of the pilot to quickly and accurately determine the true 
modal status of the aircraft by referencing his primary flight display. 
Recommendations 
 The operator-machine interface to communicate the coupled and uncoupled status 
of the AP should be redesigned. There are many ways to effect the desired changes so 
long as human factors considerations are integral in any new design proposal. Any of the 
new Boeing or Airbus products would be suitable examples of acceptable display 
interfaces for autopilot systems that are employed all around the world. Any new design 
should consistently display all modal annunciations, provide anticipation cueing and 
present truth data on the primary flight display. The outcome of such a display change 
will be an overall improvement for the safety and efficiency of the flight operations. 
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Summary 
 Four deficiencies were identified in this paper along with the fundamental human 
factors issues that led to those deficiencies. A direct correlation was established to show 
the link between a flaw in the design of a system and the potential for an in-flight 
incident or accident, or as a minimum a reduction in mission efficiency and effectiveness. 
The underlying cause factors were presented to illustrate that these deficiencies could 
create the appropriate environment that would lead to what has historically been referred 
to as pilot error. Follow-on recommendations were then submitted to offer alternatives to 
the prototype design. This is, however, only the first stage in any redesign effort. What is 
critical now is that this paper becomes a catalyst for action and change. The next step in 
the process depends on the funding, support of the sponsor and willingness of the 
contractor to accept and implement the recommendations. Doing so will result in a more 
effective, safer and easier to use product for the end user: the operational line pilot. 
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